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1.0 JURISDICTION - The Utah Supreme Court has appellant 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-3, 
(1) and (3)(c) and (3)(i), (1990 Supp.). Ref DOCKETING 
STATEMENTS of June 4, 1990 and Dec 5, 1990. 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Defendant Peterson and Pemco contracted to furnish 
technology and equipment to move the Vitro tailings to Clive 
Utah. 
2.2 The work was a government project of the Utah State 
Department of Health. 
2.3 The project used defendants1 technology and equipment for 
sorae three years during the period of the project without payment 
to defendants for their furnished properties. 
2.4 Costs to the defendants for the usage of their properties 
not paid for as contracted has escalated from $1/4 million to 
$16.22 million which is owing to defendants. 
2.5 In the spring of 1990, defendant Peterson traveled to Clive 
to check on some of his equipment there at the project site and 
found it missing. State workers there did not know of its 
whereabouts. 
2.6 Defendant Peterson contacted Project Mgr. Mark Day who also 
did not know of its whereabouts. 
2.7 Defendant Peterson expressed concern of its value, and that 
others would move it from the project without his permission. 
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2.8 Mark Day knew that Peterson was in financial difficulty 
because of not being paid for his work, and that Peterson did not 
have monies and ability to continue with the project's 
demobilization. 
2.9 Mark Day later told Peterson the location of his equipment, 
and that the State had put Peterson's equipment into storage. 
2.10 "On May 16, 1989, Larry F. Anderson, Director, Utah 
Bureau of Radiation Control, wrote to Mr. Peterson and 
PEMCO to remove the equipment within 15 days from the 
storage lot at 154 East Gordon Lane, Murray, Utah." 
2.11 "On May 23, 1989, Mr. Peterson responded to Mr. 
Anderson's letter saying that he did not have a place 
to store the equipment." Peterson also complained of 
not being paid for its usage. 
2.12 "On June 5, 1989, Mr. Anderson again wrote Mr. Peterson 
and PEMCO to remove the equipment by June 23, 1989." 
2.14 "On August 4, 1989, Mr. Anderson wrote to Mr. Peterson 
and PEMCO saying that failure to take possession of the 
equipment was tantamount to abandoning the equipment, 
and that the State intended to sell the equipment as 
surplus property to help defray its moving and storage 
costs." see AFFIDAVIT of Mark Day, items 10-13 
2.15 With each demand from the STATE the defendant wrote back 
demanding payment for its usage. 
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2.16 On January 26, 1990, Peterson filed a complaint in the 
Third District Court (Civil No. 900900523, Judge Russon/Stirba) 
complaining of not being paid and of the State's fraudulent 
payment bond. Peterson had notified the State that their bond 
was defective in July of 1985. William D. Peterson was the 
plaintiff, The State of Utah, Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson, Kenneth 
L. Alkema, and Peterson Van Alstein were the defendants. 
3.0 NATURE OF PROCEEDING IN TRIAL COURT 
3.1 On February 23, 1990 UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
(plaintiff) brought suit against WILLIAM D. PETERSON AND PEMCO 
(defendant) to have defendant move his equipment from the private 
property leased by Tom Wolff. (Civil No. 900901098, Judge Young) 
3.2 Interestingly, the STATE complained, for the moving of 
private (equipment) property, from private property, for which 
neither equipment or property the State had any rights or 
arrangement. (Ref Article IV, Constitution of the United States) 
3.3 In bringing suite against the defendant, the plaintiff 
essentially brought suit against the defendant to continue work 
on the project in the form of demobilization. 
3.4 The State's statement in their BRIEF OF APPELLEE that 
they filed a 
"declaratory judgment action against Mr. 
Peterson and his company, PEMCO, to determine whether 
equipment, which was being stored at the State's 
expense, should be considered abandoned" 
is misleading. 
The State knew that Peterson or PEMCO owned the 
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equipment, and knew that he was in hardship from not 
being paid, and that he had a demand upon the State for 
payment for their having a fraudulent payment bonding, 
monies rightfully owing to Peterson. The State had no 
rights to Peterson's properties per Articles IV, V, and 
VII of the Constitution of the United States. 
3.5 The defendant answered and counter-claimed for payment per 
entitlement including: 
a) Article IV of the Constitution of The United States, 
rights to be secure against unreasonable seizures. 
b) Article V of the Constitution of The United States, 
shall not be deprived of property without due process. 
c) Article VII of the constitution of The United States. 
Rights of trial and judgment by jury are preserved. 
d) Bonding Law Title 14, chapter 1, sections 7 and 15 
Liability of State for failure to obtain payment bond. 
e) Bonding Law Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38 
Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. 
3.6 Contrary to the BRIEF OF APPELLEE, Peterson's complaint 
in the case before Russon/Stirba is not the same as the 
counterclaims in this matter. 
3.7 The counterclaims in this matter were made before Judge 
Russon; but, Judge Russon disallowed the whole of them. 
3.8 The State's statements and writing in this matter 
saying that the defendant's counterclaim is duplicative 
of the complaint filed by Mr. Peterson is misleading 
the Judges of these courts because the State failed to 
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say that this duplicative complaint has already been 
rejected, (not allowed into the Russon Court). Judge 
Russon would allow only a much simplified complaint. 
3.9 For the plaintiff to say that the defendant can pursue 
his counterclaim in the Judge Russon/Stirba Court is a 
fraudulent lie by the State in that they know Judge 
Russon has already disallowed the "duplicative 
complaint". 
3.10 Defendant Peterson thus MOTIONS that the State's order 
motion and thus its resulting ruling ORDER OF DISMISSAL and the 
State's statements in their BRIEF OF APPELLEE are misleading to 
the Courts wherein they say that Peterson's counterclaim is 
duplicative of the complaint "NOW PENDING" in the Judge 
Russon/Stirba matter. The State knows full well that the 
duplicative complaint was disallowed by Judge Russon and not 
allowed in because of the Judge's restriction of its length. 
3.11 Peterson thus charges that the State has unlawfully 
deceived Judge Young in obtaining his dismissal, and also the 
Judges of the Supreme Court in this matter per Rule 78-51-31 and 
by so doing defendant Peterson is entitled to treble damages 
($48.6M) and so motions: 
78-51-31 DECEIT AND COLLUSION An attorney and 
counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or 
who consents thereto with intent to deceive a 
court or judge or a party to any action or 
proceeding is liable to be disbarred, and shall 
forfeit to the injured party treble damages to be 
5 
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recovered in a civil action. 
See State's BRIEF OF APPELLEE, ARGUMENT II - page i and 6 wherein 
he says DUPLICATIVE OF THE COMPLAINT NOW PENDING BEFORE THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT", compare State's addendum A and C 
(Complaint of January 26,1990) with Peterson's 10 page complaint 
of (May 8, 1990)• State's attorney knew of change, see her 
ADDENDUM B, but she persisted in declaring "DUPLICATIVE COMPLAINT 
IS NOW PENDING", see her comparison of complaints page 6, 
paragraph center of page, where, in about 150 words she compares 
the complaints, "side by side". It is obvious that the 
plaintiff's attorney is misleading the court, claiming that a 
particular complaint "IS PENDING" when, in fact, she knows it is 
not pending, when in fact, "THE ATTEMPTED SERVICE WAS QUASHED" of 
the "DUPLICATIVE COMPLAINT", by the court, per a motion made by 
the plaintiff's attorney. 
3.12 The defendant sought payment for his prior work before 
being required to continue working. 
3.13 Note that the defendant has direct entitlement for payment 
for his work done because of the State's failure to have a good 
and sufficient payment bond. 
Title 14, chapter 1, section 15 - Liability of state or political 
subdivision failing to obtain bond* requires that: 
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails 
to obtain a payment bond, it shall, upon demand by a person 
who has supplied materials or performed labor under the 
applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person, 
6 
APPELLANT'S REPLY/BRIEF ANSWER 
Utah -vs- Peterson & PEMCO 
and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his 
account against the appropriate political entity in any 
court having jurisdiction in the count in which the contract 
was to be performed. The action shall be commenced within 
one year after furnishing of materials or labor. 
Title 14, chapter 2, section 2 - Failure to require bond - Direct 
liability - Limitation of actions, requires that: 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or 
to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally 
liable to all persons who have furnished materials or 
performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value 
of such materials furnished or labor performed, not 
exceeding, however in any case the prices agreed upon. 
Actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced 
within one year from the last date the last materials were 
furnished or the labor performed. 
3.14 The defendant made various motions that the plaintiff 
answer to defendant's counterclaim and various motions for 
judgment as follows: 
Motions for relief were made and denied on dates as follows: 
Motion for Default Judgment - 4/12/90 ~ Denied - 5/7/90 
Motion for Judgment - 4/12/90 -- Denied - 5/7/90 
Motion for Judgment - 4/12/90 — Denied - 5/7/90 
Motion for Judgment for fraud - 4/12/90 — Denied - 5/7/90 
3.15 With repeated failure of the State to answer Peterson's 
counterclaim and repeated denial for judgement by the Court, 
Peterson appeals to the Supreme Court for a decision to reverse 
Judge Young's order to demobilize, default judgments, and 
variously styled motions and counterclaims, dated May 9, 1990. 
(See DOCKETING STATEMENT of June 4, 1990) 
3.16 Peterson's appeal was then denied in that there was not 
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then a final order to appeal from. 
3.17 The defendant was denied his counterclaims. 
4.0 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
4.1 THERE HAS BEEN A TRIAL COURT RULING; The plaintiff 
prevailed and obtained a judgment order against the defendant 
that he do certain work of demobilization. 
4.2 Per the order of the court, the defendant hired cranes, 
trucks, and people, and under considerable hardship defendant 
demobilized, moving hundreds of tons of equipment into storage he 
had to arrange for. 
4.3 With the plaintiff's successful in obtaining judgment and 
the relief sought, the plaintiff motioned for dismissal of the 
matter which was granted. 
4.4 The plaintiff statement in his BRIEF OF APPELLEE that 
"Judge young's final order presents two issues for 
review. First, - voluntarily dismiss its complaint. 
Second, whether Judge Young should have dismissed Mr. 
Peterson's counterclaim without prejudices as 
duplicative of his complaint before Judge Russon in 
Civil No. 90090523." 
is short cited, misleading, and deserving of judgment 
against the plaintiff's attorney for misleading the 
court, see 3.10 and 3.11 above. 
4.5 The offer of the plaintiff to voluntary dismiss its 
complaint after order, sentence, and execution of the defendant 
is irrelevant, whats done is done. 
4.6 The purporting that the defendant has another basis of 
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prosecuting his counterclaim, that it is "DUPLICATIVE OF THE 
COMPLAINT NOW PENDING BEFORE THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT" is a 
fraudulent lie, misleading the court, wherein the plaintiff knows 
that the court of Judge Russon refused to accept Peterson's 
complaint, because of length and its complications. Again 
because the plaintiff's misleading of the court, the defendant 
motions for judgment per 78-51-31, see 3.6 to 3.11 above. 
4.7 The plaintiff State cited City of Monticello v. 
Christensen - Affirmed -
The cited case was a criminal 
matter which affirmed that "The standard rule is that 
appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the 
actions or judgements of an inferior tribunal upon the 
record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or 
reverse such action or judgment." 
4.8 The plaintiff also cited State v. Rio Vista Oil, 
Ltd., - Vacated and remanded -
wherein the State sought 
a temporary restraining order, charging that Rio Vista, 
a gasoline retailer in Utah, offered to sell motor fuel 
below cost in Moab, Utah, and in American Fork. 
Appeal and Error: 
1) Supreme Court had to assume that trial judge found 
his findings and conclusions to be satisfactory on all 
particulars, despite inconsistency, where findings and 
conclusions were signed by trial judge and were not 
attacked on appeal as not representing his views. 
2) Conclusions of law are not accorded added 
deference on appeal simply because they are denominated 
findings of fact; Supreme Court disregards labels and 
looks to substance. 
3) Lower court's statutory interpretations are 
accorded no particular deference on appeal, but are 
assessed for correctness, as are any other conclusions 
of law. 
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5.0 NATURE OF THE CASE 
5.1 The case involves a question of entitlement of the defendant 
to be paid for his technologies and equipment provided for and 
used on a government project. 
5.2 In his "BRIEF OF APPELLEE" plaintiff states "case 
involves a question of disposition of equipment and 
defendant Peterson's counterclaim." Peterson's 
technology and equipment have partially been sold by 
the State of Utah to Union Pacific's "U.S. Pollution 
Co." Other of Peterson's equipment was demobilized by 
putting into storage as ordered of Peterson by the 
court. Nothing has been paid to Peterson for the 
state's usage of his technologies and equipment. They 
have not been taken by due process of law, Articles V 
and VII of the Constitution of the United States. 
5.3 When the State of Utah complained against the defendant for 
him to continue with his equipment by demobilizing, Peterson 
counterclairaed for payment for the State's prior usage of his 
technologies and equipment. 
5.4 When the State of Utah complained against the defendant for 
not having paid child support (when Peterson did not have monies 
and was out of work), Peterson counterclaim for payment for the 
State's prior usage of his technologies and equipment. 
5.5 When the State with his wife ordered him from his home and 
10 
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brought suit against him for divorce because of him not being 
able to support his family, Peterson counterclaimed for payment 
for the State's prior usage of his technologies and equipment. 
5.6 In all, his counterclaims were ignored and not answered, and 
by so, Peterson is entitled to default judgment. 
6.0 PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
6.1 Initially, when not paid, Peterson brought civil proceedings 
in the Federal District Court against The Argee Corporation. 
Attorney John P. Sampson interfered in this matter and suit was 
subsequently brought against him and his clients Robert Mouritsen 
and John McSweeney. This matter is currently before the Board of 
Appeals, Supreme Court No. 910079, see cover sheet reference. 
Sampson has fraudulently intervened between Peterson and his 
attorneys taking Peterson's assets for Mouritsen and McSweeney. 
6.2 In this matter the defendant made a prior appeal the for 
reversal of a prior Judge Young court's ruling order and ask for 
relief for his previous costs and the additional costs of de-
mobilization, (the costs of the courts ruling). 
See DOCKETING STATEMENT of June 4, 1990 
6.3 In the plaintiff's "BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE" he treats the 
matter as if no judgment order was ever rendered. After the 
court ruling order against the defendant, and then after the 
defendants performance per the court order, the plaintiff 
motioned for and obtained dismissal. By court order, the 
11 
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defendant was thus forced to do additional work of demobilization 
without enumerations, contrary to his rights for payment and 
rights of defense per Articles V and VII of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
7.0 STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
7.1 Peterson's technologies and equipment now still at Clive and 
other equipment which was stored on Gordon Lane were never sold 
to either the Argee Corporation or the State of Utah since they 
were not paid for per Article V of the U.S. Constitution. These 
properties were and remain the properties of Peterson even though 
they were used for three years by the State and his contractor, 
without payment to Peterson as noted. 
7.2 The State's complaint of incurring ongoing expenses in 
storing Peterson's equipment is out of order. The stand of the 
State is like unto returning a rental car and asking for storage 
costs instead of paying for its usage. The State and its 
contractor did have an arrangement with Peterson to use his 
technologies and equipment to move the Vitro tailings. The 
arrangement required payment for said usage. The State or Argee 
never had any arrangement with Peterson for storage of his 
equipment. Peterson has not been paid for usage of his assets. 
8.0 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
8.1 In the plaintiff's "BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE" he says that 
there are no justiciable issues. He is ignoring the fact that 
12 
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the defendant believes that he was wrongfully given judgment and 
that he seeks restitution for the wrongful judgment as afforded 
to him per articles IV, V, and VII of the Constitution of the 
United State, wherein the government cannot take property from 
him without restitution and due process of law including trial by 
jury. Restitution must include costs of demobilization. 
8.2 The State entered this case on the supposition of and from 
the position that they were keeper and storer of Peterson's 
properties from which they demanded relief. 
8.3 In reality the State with its subcontractor was a contracted 
user of Peterson's technologies and equipment for which use the 
State and its subcontractor are responsible to pay; and, to 
obtain and hold bonding for its payment liability; of which they 
have done neither. 
8.4 The defendant seeks to get this court matter in proper 
perspective. 
8.5 The treatment of the defendant before Judge Young was 
grossly defective in its deficiencies. 
8.6 In making judgment against him, the defendant's answers to 
complaint were ignored by the court, (his answers being included 
in his counterclaim and motions). 
8.7 The plaintiff failed to answer to the defendant's 
counterclaim. At least five times the defendant demanded answers 
to his counterclaim. In some instances the plaintiff answered in 
13 
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motions and in some instances the plaintiff simply failed to 
answer. Record of this and conversation of this between the 
plaintiff's attorney and the court is in the proceedings. 
8.8 The plaintiff was crafty and deceiving in that it was able 
to obtain a dismissal of the matter while avoiding answering to 
the court the charges of the defendant's counterclaim. 
8.9 The plaintiff has had opportunity (even in the BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE) to answer the real issues and should explain the merits 
of his position in taking the works of the defendant's without 
payment for them. 
8.10 The plaintiff's craftiness and deceit in answering has now 
put it in a position of judgment whereby plaintiff claims that 
there has been no finding of facts; wherein there are no further 
facts and the plaintiff has no further defense except in his 
efforts to avoid the issue and seek relief solely by dismissal of 
this matter from review of the Supreme Court. 
9.0 ARGUMENT 
9.1 The defendant is entitled to judgement solely because of the 
plaintiff's failure to answer to the defendant's complaint. 
9.2 The defendant also is entitled to judgment on the basis of 
merits of his complaint. Copies of the bogus bonding documents 
of the plaintiff are presented. The plaintiff's complaint of not 
completing de-mobilization evidences the work and technology. 
9.3 The court failed to recognize the defendants rights and the 
14 
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plaintiff's failure to answer to the defendant's complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE ARE JUSTICIABLE ISSUES REMAINING IN THE 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST THE 
STATE AND, THE STATE FRAUDULENTLY DECEIVED 
THE COURT PURPORTING A LIE (78-51-31), THE 
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE MATTER IS BASED UPON 
A FALSE REPRESENTATION MADE BY THE ATTORNEY 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF. THE SUPREME COURT MUST 
REVIEW THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY 
AND RULING OF THE COURT IN VIEW OF CORRECT 
INFORMATION. FURTHERMORE, THE ISSUE IS NOT 
WHETHER PETERSON SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
STORAGE OF SAID EQUIPMENT, THE ISSUE IS THAT 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PAID FOR THE 
GOVERNMENTS'S USAGE OF SAID EQUIPMENT. 
9.4 At issue is the State's requirement that the defendant 
continue work without payment for the previous work and without 
payment for the work immediately demanded; or contrarily, i.e. 
that the defendant shall be paid for his costs of providing said 
work. 
9.5 The matter is now further complicated with additional monies 
owing to the defendant for his work in that the defendant has now 
accomplished the additional work of demobilization as sought by 
the complaint of the plaintiff. 
9.6 The plaintiff states that "there no justiciable issues", and 
that "this issue has been resolved". This is true only in that 
the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant and the 
defendant paid and performed according to the order of the court. 
9.7 The defendant rightfully appeals this mater seeking relief 
from the order of the court and associated counterclaims for 
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costs of the judgment made against the defendant associated with 
the defendants constitutional rights and rights per state law as 
indicated. 
9.8 Contrary to plaintiff claims, evidence of Peterson's claims 
were introduced into the lower court and the Supreme Court has 
record of this in Peterson's brief and Peterson's previously 
filed referenced papers. 
9.9 On bottom of page 5 of appellee's brief, the plaintiff 
states that: 
a) "The controversy arising from the State's complaint 
against Mr. Peterson and PEMCO is final" 
b) "A judgment is final when it ends the controversy 
between the parties litigant." 
9.10 Per his rightful entitlement, the defendant has appealed 
for relief and costs of Judge Young's ruling against the 
defendant. 
9.11 The plaintiff has referred to another court matter of 
Peterson's before Judge Russon/Stirba. In comparison: 
a) The contending parties in this matter are different. 
b) The complaint of the state requiring additional work of 
demobilization is not an issue in the R/S matter. 
c) There is no reason to expect that issues of the 
immediate matter (ruling order of Judge Young) should 
become issues in the Court of Judge Russon/Stirba. 
16 
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d) Additional matters including the misrepresentation of 
the plaintiff's attorney and the failing of the 
plaintiff's attorney to answer the defendants complaint 
are issues in the immediate case requiring review. 
Wherein, these matters cannot be transferred to another 
matter (R/S case). 
Judge Young's final order should be upheld and the 
plaintiff's appeal should be prosecuted by the Supreme Court. 
9.12 The merits of the ruling order of Judge Young are 
rightfully appealed herein. 
9.13 If the issues of matter in the ruling order of Judge Young 
should rightfully be instead in the matter of Judge 
Russon/Stirba, the plaintiff was out of order in bringing the 
issue into the court of Judge Young, in the first place. 
9.14 The plaintiff's statement in II. on page 6 "THERE HAS BEEN 
NO TRIAL COURT RULING ON THE MERITS OF THE COUNTERCLAIM" is 
conflictive with fact, and with his statement in his CONCLUSION 
on page 8 wherein he writes of "the trial court's order granting 
the State's motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint and 
dismissing Mr. Peterson's counterclaim against the State without 
prejudice." 
9.15 There has been a ruling on the merits of Peterson's 
counterclaim, his counterclaim was dismissed. 
9.16 In his appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant is 
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rightfully entitled to the review of the merits of his counter-
claim and its decision of dismissal by the trial court, according 
to the evidence of fact contained therein. 
9.17 On page 7, line 19, the plaintiff writes of it being 
inequitable to defend the same action in two different lawsuits. 
Note that the defendant in seeking a fair treatment, has so far 
had to bring in this issue into six state courts and three 
federal courts - nine trial courts in all. This matter can 
rightfully, justly, and most speedily be determined in this 
proper appeal per Rule 1(a) as Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifies. 
9.18 Otherwise, this matter will be appealed to the federal 
courts of the United States, even appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the United States in order to obtain an equitable trial and 
payment for properties taken for government use per the rights of 
the defendant per the Constitutions of the United States. 
9.19 The issues before the Supreme courts are the review of 
judgements of the trial court, not the matter's dismissal as the 
plaintiff wishes were the focus. 
9.20 The review before the Supreme Court is the review of trial 
matter presented in proceedings. It is not the review and 
complaint of matter not present as the plaintiff complain's 
wherein anything missing is his deficiency. 
9.21 Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton was cited; wherein, a 
city brought suit against landowners, seeking an 
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injunction to compel removal of a fence, compensatory 
and punitive damages. The District Court ruled in 
favor of the city on its claim for injunctive relief, 
reserving ruling on the damage claims and the 
landowners claims; the landowners appealed. The appeal 
was dismissed in that the trial court's ruling was not 
a final judgment for purposes of appeal. 
9.22 Court Judge Young did not reserve ruling, judgment was 
final, a dismissal now of the appeal is out of order. 
9.23 Kennedy v. New Era Industries was cited; wherein 
judgment "imposing sanctions" for failure to respond 
adequately to interrogatories was not final for 
purposes of appeal where such judgment did not dispose 
of all parties and issues in litigation. 
9.24 Court Judge Young did not impose sanctions, plaintiff's 
failure to answer to defendant's counterclaim was not error, 
or accident or misstatement, but simply unexcusable failure. 
9.25 Within Kennedy v. New Era Industries was cited Rule 
75(h) which provides: That if anything material to 
either party is omitted from the record on appeal by 
error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties 
by stipulation, or the district court, either before or 
after the record is transmitted to the Supreme Court, 
... on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative, 
may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be 
corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record 
shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the 
district court. 
9.26 Of his own initiative, the defendant has included a 
different complaint and interrogatories and their respective 
answers. What is made apparent is that the State basically does 
not have answers to Peterson's counter-complaint but purports 
that its documents speak for themselves and its posture requires 
judgments of law, i.e. the plaintiff State has no information to 
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add. 
9.27 Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services was 
cited. saying - matters not admitted in evidence 
before trier of fact will not be considered on appeal 
before Supreme Court. 
9.28 By his counterclaim, defendant introduced the matter that 
he has not been paid fo.r his previous work, that he has 
entitlement to be paid for his cost because the plaintiffs bond 
was defective, and that he has rights of keeping his corporate 
filings in Utah Division of Corporate Registrations. These 
admitted matters have entitlement to be considered on this appeal 
before the Supreme Court. 
9.29 In answer to interrogatories on these matters, the State's 
representatives say the bonding laws, the Vitro contract bonding 
documents, and Peterson company's corporation file documents 
speak for themselves and that determination of these matters is a 
matter of determination of law. Of these matters, it is now 
appropriate for a determination law by the Supreme Court. 
9.30 The plaintiff has had further opportunities and 
requirements to answer. By his answers before Judge Russon, the 
plaintiff has nothing to add to the matter in Judge Young. By 
the State's record in Judge Russon, matters must now be 
determined by judgments of Law, appropriately, the Supreme Court. 
10.0 ADDENDUM COMPLAINT 
10.1 R C Tolman Const. Co., v. Myton Water Ass'n, was cited; 
wherein a construction company appealed a District 
Court decision to withhold monies for damages because 
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plaintiff overran contracted time period. The Supreme 
Court affirmed findings noting the presumption of 
validity and correctness of the judgment of the trial 
court; and require plaintiff to sustain the burden of 
showing error. 
10.2 The plaintiff has shown its error, in its fraudulently 
purporting the existence of a duplicate pending complaint in 
another matter, when, in fact, the service of the purported 
complaint was "QUASHED by the plaintiff". The plaintiff has 
clearly shown that it fraudulently misled the trial court in its 
obtaining ruling and dismissal in its BRIEF OF APPELLEE court 
order of 7 May 1990 clearly rules out the "DUPLICATIVE NOW 
PENDING COMPLAINT" conjecture of the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
has shown no basis for continuing this matter in the court of 
Judge Russon/Stirba, but just the opposite. The plaintiff has 
made the cases distinctly different by fraudulently purporting 
"DUPLICATIVE PENDING COMPLAINTS" and by their demonstrated deceit 
in the court, another parties to the matter are brought in -
attorneys R. Paul Van Dam, Brent A. Burnett, Denise Chancellor, 
and Richard K.Rathburn. 
11.0 MOTION 
11.1 The plaintiff State obtained dismissal in the Court of 
Judge Young on the basis that PETERSON'S COUNTERCLAIM IS 
DUPLICATIVE OF THE COMPLAINT NOW PENDING BEFORE THE COURT OF 
JUDGE RUSSON/STIRBA. 
11.2 The plaintiff State is making the same representation of 
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DUPLICATIVE COMPLAINT IS NOW PENDING before the Supreme Court. 
11.3 In the plaintiffs BRIEF OF APPELLEE, the plaintiff further 
made a comparison "side by side" of the defendant's counterclaim 
and a complaint, the same complaint quashed (not allowed by the 
plaintiffs motion) in the pending matter - court of Judge 
Russon/Stirba. 
11.4 By her own submissions, (ADDENDUM B - BRIEF OF APPELLEE) 
the attorney for the plaintiff has deceived the court of Judge 
Young, and is attempting to likewise deceive the judges of the 
Supreme Court, by claiming that a complaint of Peterson's is NOW 
PENDING; when, in fact, the plaintiff's attorney had the service 
of it QUASHED 1i i 
11.5 Note further that the plaintiffs attorney knows which 
complaint is pending in the Russon/Stirba matter in that she 
answered the complaint. 
11.6 The defendant motions that the court find that the 
plaintiffs attornies have unlawfully deceived judges of the 
court per Rule 78-51-31 and by doing so defendant Peterson is 
entitled to treble damages ($48.6M), for which he so motions. 
12.0 SUMMARY 
12.1 The State legislated law seems to have intent consistent 
with the intent of constitutional requirement Article V wherein 
an individual should be paid for his property taken and used for 
public use. The actions of the State's employees and the State's 
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court appear to be just the opposite, wherein their every 
efforts, even unlawful, are to deprive the individual of payment, 
even seizing his properties and preventing hira from a fair jury 
trial, which rights Peterson has by Articles IV and VII of the 
Constitution. 
12.2 Peterson's contribution to moving the Vitro Tailing were 
very substantial, wherein his engineering prescribed and made 
possible its movement by the railroad. This in spite of the 
tailing wetness problem, information of this being withheld by 
the State, and Peterson becoming the fall guy for the State's 
misrepresentation problems. 
12.3 On a $50M project, $16.2M for his engineering, proprietary 
technology, and his equipment is not unreasonable. Since 
Peterson solely devised and made the working and the solving of 
the problem job possible, even being done in 2/3 of the allotted 
time, even $48.6M is justifiable. The court should rightfully 
award defendant treble his cost in this matter as prescribed by 
Constitutional and State laws. 
13.0 SIGNATURE 
Dated this '<. day of July, 1991. 
William D. Peterson, pro se 
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14.0 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that 4 (four) true and correct copies of 
the fore going 
REPLY/BRIEF APPEAL, with ADDENDUM 
COMPLAINT AND MOTION 
are being delivered at the 
office of the Attorney General, State Capital building in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, per rule 5 (b)l and rule 4 (e)(9), in an 
envelope addressed to: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - #3312 Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT - #4004 Assistant Attorney General 
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452 Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD K. RATHBURN, USB #5183 Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dated this lZ- st day of July, 1991. . \ \ / *• Dfr&~~—-^ 
William D. Peterson 
15.0 ADDENDUM 
15.1 AFFIDAVIT of Mark S. Day, State of Utah - Vitro Project Mgr. 
15.2 DOCKETING STATEMENT - Appeal from Judge Young orders June 4, 1990 
15.3 NOTICE OF APPEAL - Appeal from Judge Young orders May 22, 1990 
15.4 ORDER - Order of Judge Young appealed from May 9, 1990 
15.5 COMPLAINT - filed in the court of Judge Russon, May 1990 
15.6 ANSWERS - to complaint in the court of Judge Russon, June 6, 1990 
15.7 INTERROGATORIES - Peterson's questions to State personnel 
15.8 ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES - Answers from State personnel 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
AFFIDAVIT £ 
Mark S. Day, after first being duly sworn on oath, z. 
3 
deposes and says: ^ 
1. I am employed by the Utah Bureau of Radiation -3 
Control, Utah Department of Health, as Project Manager of the K_ 
Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Projects and am responsible 
for administration of the Vitro tailings removal project at 
Clive, Utah. 
2. Part of my responsibilities as Project Manager 
were/are planing and design, bidding and procurement, 
construction management, and completion and monitoring of the 
Vitro tailings removal project. 
3. PEMCO and William D. Peterson contracted with the 
State's contractor, Argee Corporation, to catch and stack the. 
Vitro tailings after Argee Corporation off-loaded the tailings N 
from railroad cars when they arrived at the Clive^ite. <^-bdtQ 
4. As a result of a contract dispute between P^MCO 
and Argee Corporation, the.equipment to whicn William D. Peterson 
and/or PEMCO claim ownership, after being in service for a short 
time, was no longer used for moving the tailings and was 
dismantled from the tailings site in approximately July 1985. 
5. The equipment was moved to a nearby area, which 
w 
was then owned by the State, because it interfered with Argee y 
Corporation's operations. 
6. Approximately two years later (1987) the Clive tj 
property where the equipment was located was sold by the State Op" 
and the new owner requested that the equipment be moved from his 
property. p 
7. The State had difficulty in locating Mr. Peterson 
but eventually found him and gave him verbal notices to remove 
the equipment from the property the State had sold. 
8. Neither Mr. Peterson nor PEMCO removed the ^_ 
equipment from the privately-owned Clive property. 
9. In approximately February or March 1989 the last 
State contractor at the Vitro site, Wolff Excavating, was de-
mobilizing the site and the State requested that Wolff Excavating 
move the equipment to its storage lot in Murray, Utah as the 
owner of the Clive property wanted his property cleared. 
10. On May 16, 1989 Larry F. Anderson, Director, Utah 
Bureau of Radiation Control, wrote to Mr. Peterson and PEMCO to 
remove the equipment within 15 days from the storage lot at 154 
East Gordon Lane, Murray, Utah. 
11. On May 23, 1989 Mr. Peterson responded to Mr. 
Anderson's letter saying that he did not have a place to store 
the equipment. 
3 
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12. On June 5, 1989 Mr. Anderson again wrote the Mr. 
Peterson and PEMCO to remove the equipment by June 23, 1989. 
13. On August 4, 1989 Mr. Anderson wrote to Mr. 
Peterson and PEMCO stating that failure to take possession of the 
equipment was tantamount to abandoning the equipment and that the 
State intended to sell the equipment as surplus property to help 
defray its moving and storage costs. 
14. To date Mr. Peterson or PEMCO have not moved the 
equipment and the State is incurring a $200 per month expense for 
storage of the equipment. 
DATED this *~> day of AP£11— 1990. 
'^Qlk 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3'* day of 
, 1990. 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 c, <-' sy 
Residing at £f<5%'Q^CI^J^<_ C^-^JC. 
-3-
William D. Peterson II June 4, 1990. 
Telephone (801) 485-9011 
c/o Paul E. Peterson 
1444 Murphy's Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 278-3435 f ile:J$LegalJ$sc-youngJsY6-4 .doc 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH 
Utah State Department ] 
of Health ] 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- ] 
William D. Peterson & PEMCO 
Defendants, Petitioner 
) DOCKETING STATEMENT 
i Supreme Court No. *5&Q£&2~* 
i Appealed from 
) Third District Court 
} Civil No. 900901098 
i Judge David S. Young 
Relating Supreme Court No. 900215 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the appellant files this docketing 
statement. 
1. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on this 
court by Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec 78-2-2, subsections (1) 
and (3)(c). 
2. This appeal is from an order entered May 9, 1990 by 
Judge David S. Young in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The case was originally 
filed on February 23, 1990. 
Motions for relief were made and denied on dates as follows: 
Motion for Default Judgment - 4/12/90 — Denied - 5/7/90 
Motion for Judgment - 4/12/90 — Denied - 5/7/90 
Motion for Judgment - 4/12/90 — Denied - 5/7/90 
Motion for Judgment for fraud - 4/12/90 — Denied - 5/7/90 
3. The order appealed was entered on the 12st day of May, 
1990. A notice of appeal was filed in the clerk's office of the 
lower court on 22th day of May, 1990, service of motion under 
rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59. 
4. The facts as to what happened are as follows: 
4-1. The appeal on May 22th of the above named defendant is from 
that judgment entered by the above entitled court on the 12st day 
of May, 1990 and from the whole thereof. In all, relief from the 
' - > * 
matter has been ask for in nine motions. This appeal is taken 
from the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
and is taken to the court of Appeals. Defendant is now situated 
in this matter where judgment has been made upon him without 
support of law wherein defendant is entitled to the benefits of 
judgment as a matter of law: Title 14f chapter 1, section 7 and 
15 - Liability of State for failure to obtain payment bond, Title 
63, chapter 56, Sec. 38 - Bonds necessary when contract is 
awarded, and Article V of the Constitution of the United States 
which requires that private property cannot be taken for public 
use without just compensation. Defendant is entitled as a matter 
of law and stands denied judgment without reason of law. 
4-2. In 1985, the defendant in his capacity of a professional 
engineer furnished designs used for three years for the railroad 
dumping and transporting of the vitro tailings in Utahfs west 
desert. Likewise, defendant in his capacity of owning equipment 
furnished equipment for rail car dumping and material 
transporting. Plaintiff through his contractor the Argee 
Corporation used defendant's design and equipment for some three 
years for moving the entire vitro tailings. 
Defendant's company PEMCO originally contracted the vitro 
equipment work. Shortly after starting, plaintiffs contractor 
breached agreement by not making payment as contracted. Without 
payment, Pemco could not continue operating and the Argee-Pemco 
contract became void. After the breach, defendant personally 
contracted with Argeefs manager Jack Adams to complete the work, 
and furthermore did completed work. 
Defendant should be paid for usage of his designs, equipment 
and labor, and to continue supplying to plaintiff to demobilize. 
Defendant gave notice to the State that their project did not 
have a good and sufficient payment bond, that defendant was not 
being paid, and that litigation would result. When defendant was 
seeking payment in July of 1985, the State did not have a good 
and sufficient payment bond applicable to this their project. 
The project documents stated voiding requirements of a good and 
sufficient payment bond - (see voiding disclaimer). 
Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38. requires that bonds necessary 
when contract is awarded. A representation of a bond was made 
and used. The representation was fraudulent. Defendant 
complained to the State for recourse because of the State's not 
having a good and sufficient payment bond. The State is liable 
to pay defendant by law because of their not having a good and 
sufficient payment bond as required per Title 14, chapter 1, Sec. 
7. Liability of public body for failure to obtain payment bond. 
The State is also liable to pay defendant by law per Title 
14, chapter 1, Sec. 15. Liability of state or political 
subdivision failing to obtain bond. Plaintiff told defendant 
that before defendant could obtain recourse of payment from 
plaintiff, defendant must seek recourse from plaintiff's 
contractor through legal channels of courts. Defendant followed 
plaintiffs instructions, doing as plaintiff instructed. Owner's 
attorney and engineer fraudulently instructed defendant to seek 
recourse from the Argee Corporation stating that they were not 
liable until defendant exhausted that recourse. But, by law the 
owner (State of Utah) was liable and their statements to 
defendant were fraudulent and misguiding to avoid the owner's 
responsibilities. The plaintiff owner is liable to the plaintiff 
for damages for their fraudulent misguidance and 
misrepresentations when defendant sought for payment. 
This demand is proper and timely now in that the defendant 
contracted in writing, open ended, with Garth Wilson, to write of 
these problems to seek monies required to pay for costs of work. 
Plaintiff was rightfully in requirement to pay costs of 
defendant's work when their contractor breached his obligation, 
said requirement is in writing by the original "Project Manual". 
CONTRACT pg 1-35, par 4: "In consideration of the foregoing 
premises, the Department agrees to pay to Contractor in the 
manner and in the amount provided in the said specifications 
and proposal." 
The PERFORMANCE BOND section of the State's Vitro Project 
Manual cites (Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
further stating: 
"and all liabilities on this bond shall be determined in 
accordance with said provisions to the same extent as if it 
were copied at length herein." 
Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 requires that 
if a subcontractor is not adequately paid by the general 
contractor which he is working for, then the State is obligated 
to pay the subcontractor for his costs of doing work. Note: The 
repealing of a section of law does not void its usage as wordage, 
definition, description and requirement, which the State used. 
Furthermore, the project "BOND" documents specifically 
exempt Argee from requirements of payment bonding and paying 
their subcontractors. 
"NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such 
that if the said Principal shall faithfully perform the 
contract in accordance with the plans, specifications, and 
conditions thereof, then this obligation shall be void: 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect." 
When this was brought to plaintiffs attention by defendant, 
plaintiff said that they errored in their contracting with Argee. 
Later, effective 15th of August 1985, the Plaintiff changed his 
contract document "PAYMENT BOND" section. Changes to the 
contract document on the 15th of August 1985 was done so as to 
have a good and sufficient payment bond. The effective date of 
the good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" in the contract began 
August 1985f nearly a month after defendant provided his initial 
work. No good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" was effective during 
when defendant was doing his initial workf for which he needs 
payment. Payment bonding requirement provisions were added to 
the "Project Contract" on August 15, 1989 after defendant brought 
notice of plaintiffs deficiency to them. 
The "PROJECT MANUAL" contract documents effective during 
when defendant was doing his work required that plaintiff pay for 
work of defendant if plaintiff's contractor failed to make 
payment which is the condition. When defendant complained to 
plaintiffs, plaintiffs instructed defendant to first seek payment 
from Argee through processes of the courts. According to 
plaintiffs instructions/ defendant sought payment through the 
processes of the courts. 
While seeking paymentf defendant was blamed for problems 
associated with the material being wetf not dryable. The 
dryabality problems were not known by defendant, but known by 
plaintiff, this but information was withheld by defendant. The 
owner failed to inform its contractor Argee Corp or its engineer 
Peterson of owner's knowledge of the different conditions. 
Defendant was wrongfully held liable for the information had only 
by the owner and withheld by the owner. Conditions that were 
encountered differed materially from those indicated, which 
engineer relied upon to his detriment, thus engineer Peterson is 
entitled to recover because the contract documents misrepresented 
conditions that would be encountered. Entitlement is based upon 
referenced law. The defendant was defamed in his industry and 
family, and still not paid. The plaintiff owner is responsible 
to the defendant for his costs, losses, and damages for their 
withholding of information. 
If plaintiffs claim this action by the defendant is not 
timely, then plaintiffs instruction to the defendant were 
fraudulent. According to law, defendant has properly notified 
plaintiff of his dilemma and losses giving "notice of claim." 
The court in the "STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICE" 
is a "court having jurisdiction in the county in which the 
contract was performed and executed" per 14-1-7 and 14-1-15. 
Defendant made a proper claim and action in a court having 
jurisdiction in the county where defendant's labors (his 
technologies) and his equipment was being used. Plaintiffs are 
liable to defendant by default for their failure to answer. 
The Peterson's family income had been only around $7,000 per 
year because of their business being crippled from not being paid 
for its work, thus they became vulnerable from outsiders. 
Evidently with a call from an attorney John P. Sampson and by his 
supposed letter, Sampson apparently persuaded State attorney 
Peter Van Alstein to disallow or remove previous filings of the 
board of directors of current record, which directors were of 
record of the initial filing of Peterson's corporation. The 
effect of Sampson's actions were to take control of defendant's 
business and give control to Sampson's clients Robert Mouritsen 
and John McSweeney who have repeatedly and fraudulently filed as 
officers and directors over the filing of Peterson and his 
lawfully initially registered directors to steal Peterson's and 
His family's business and properties. 
Attorney John P. Sampson's in affidavit fraudulently claims 
to be attorney and representative for Riverside Machine and 
Fabrication (MAC Industries) back in June of 1986 and since. In 
contradiction, in the court of Judge John Rokich in affidavit 
attorney John P. Sampson states that he has never been attorney 
for Peterson or any of his businesses. Attorney Van Alstein for 
the State of Utah told Peterson that anyone at anytime can come 
to his division and file themselves as officers and directors of 
any corporation on file in the state of Utah. State Attorney Van 
Alstein has no basis for removing filed documents. The 
plaintiff's operation of his Corporations and Commercial Code 
Division allowed the invasion of others into and over defendant's 
business. The plaintiff's attorney Peter Van Alstein intervened 
and canceled defendant's proper and lawful filings of his 
business posturing his company for a fraudulent takeover 
allowable and possible because of unlawful actions and bad 
operation code of the plaintiff's (The State of Utah). 
The plaintiff is thus liable to the defendant for his 
overturned taking of his business and properties, property he was 
deprived of, without due process of law guaranteed to him by 
ARTICLE V of the Constitution and taken without the right of 
trial jury preserved to him by ARTICLE VII of the Constitution. 
Attorney Van Alstein further stated that he would welcome a law 
suite in this matter to obtain decisions of how to deal with this 
perpetual problem relating to paper thievery of Utah 
Corporations. 
5. The issues are: 
5-1. Is the defendant entitled to payment for cost in providing 
his property for public use. 
5-1. Is the defendant entitled to payment for cost in providing 
for a public project which requires by law payment bonding and 
the contract bonding documents were deficient, fraudulent, 
misrepresenting, and not proper and timely. 
5-2. Is the defendant entitled to make keep instated filings in 
the State's division of Corporations. Can the State remove 
defendant's filings allowing filing over him and theft of his 
a) entitlement according to Article V of the Constitu. 
the United States. 
b) Title 14, chapter 1, section 7 and 15 - Liability of State 
for failure to obtain payment bond 
c) Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38 - Bonds necessary when 
contract is awarded. 
7. There is one prior appeal related to this one, now 
before this Court, an appeal No. 900215 of the Judgment of Judge 
John Rokich in case # 50-265-1148 dated the 17th day of April 
1990 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah is appealed to this Supreme Court. This 
case relates in that this matter was also in the hands of 
representation of attorney John Sampson who mishandled it badly. 
Sampson's handling had an appearance of compromise and of washing 
matters under the table to rid Peterson to allow Sampson's other 
clients to take and steal Peterson's business from him. 
8. Attachments: 
a) Copies of the judgment of 5/12/90 appealed. 
b) No findings of the court were given. 
c) Notice of appeal - 5/22/90. 
Motions denied, Judgment requested 
d) Motion for Judgment per Article V of Constitution 
of the United States - originally filed 4-12-90. 
e) Motion for Judgment per Utah law Title 14, chapter 1 
sections 7 & 15 - originally filed 4-12-90. 
f) Motion for Judgment per Utah law Title 14, chapter 1, 
sections 7 & 15 - originally filed 4-12-90. 
g) Motion for Judgment for Fraud - originally filed 4-12-90. 
Motion related to Supreme Court Case No. 900215 
h) Motion for Reinstatement of Documents filed in 
Division of Corporations. 
Dated this ^ day of June, 1990. 
William D. Peterson, pre se 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the fore 
going 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
are being delivered at the office 
of the Attorney General, State Capital building in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, per rule 5 (b)l and rule 4 (e)(9), in an envelope 
addressed to: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT - 4004 
Assistant Attorney General 
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452 
Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD K. RATHBURN, USB #5183 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dated this _ _ _ _ t h day of June, 1990. 
William D. Peterson 
v/ 
l-i i 11 i am D . Fe tens on 
c'o Paul E. Peterson 
1444 Murphy'= Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*1106 
Telephone CSG1^273-343 5, 4S5-*011 
State o-f Utah ^5. U'm Fe ter son 
Apr i 1 24, 1^0 
Ma-- 22, 19c0 
file:\StCC\Y5-22.AFL 
IrJ THE THIFD JUDICIAL DISTFICT COUPT IN *-ND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Utah State Department of Health 
Plaintiff, 
- k ' S -
Nilliam D. Peterson & PEMCO 
- Defendants 
NOTICE OF A F P E M L 
C1"i1 No. ^00901098 
Judge David S. Nrouna 
TO THE CLEPK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
Y'ou will please take notice that the above named Pirst Far tv 
Defendant appeals from that judgment entered bv the abo'»e 
entitled court on the 9th d^y of Ma/, 1990 and from the whole 
thereof. This appeal is taken from the Third Judicial Court of 
Salt Lake Counts, State of Utah and is taken to the court of 
Appeals (The Utah Supreme Court;. A Petition for Interlocutor/ 
Appeal and a motion for judgment will follow. 
Dated this _f_ ds/ o-f Ms> , 19*0. 
William D. Peterson, Defendant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB # 5452 
Assistant Attorney General 
RICHARD K. RATHBUN, USB #5183 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Plaintiff, : O R D E R 
v. : Civil No. 900901098 
WILLIAM D. PETERSON AND PEMCO : 
Judge David S. YOUNG 
Defendants. : 
The above captioned matter came before the Court, 
Honorable David S. Young presiding, on May 7, 1990, for hearing 
on Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause. The Defendant also raised a 
motion for default judgment and other associated motions 
appearing in Defendants' Answer and Counter Claim* 
William D. Peterson appeared pro se, stating that he 
would proceed without counsel. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Denise Chancellor and Brent Burnett, Assistant Attorneys General. 
The Court, having heard the arguments from Mr. Peterson 
and from counsel for the Plaintiff, and having reviewed the 
record before it, nowf for good cause appearing, enters the 
following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants have 30 days, 
without extension, to remove the equipment described in 
Plaintiff's complaint and located at 154 E. Gordon Lane, Murray, 
Utah. If all the equipment is not removed on or before 5:00 p.m. 
Friday, June 8, 1990 then the equipment will be deemed forfeited 
to the State and may be sold as abandoned property under the 
State Surplus Property statute. All proceeds from the sele of 
the abandoned property may be applied to liquidate the State's 
storage, transportation and other costs associated with moving 
and storing the said equipment, with any remaining funds remitted 
to Mr. Peterson. If the Defendants remove the equipment within 
30 days then the State must bring a separate civil action in 
order to recoup expenses it incurred in the moving and storage of 
the equipment. 
IT IS ALSO ORDERED the Defendants' Motion for Default 
Judgment and other variously styled motions appended to 
Defendants' Answer and Counter Claim are hereby denied. 
Dated this ^ ^ ^ day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
l$r~/--JUDGE DAVKTS. YOUNG 
Third D i ^ t r i d t Cbtttt 
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William D. Peterson 
c/o Paul E. Peterson 
1444 Murphy's Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801)278-3435, 485-9011 
file: \legal\state\NewComp.ans 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
William D. Peterson 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
The State of Utah 
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson 
Kenneth Lt Alk@!M 
Peter Van Alstein 
Defendants 
COMPLAINT 
amended from previous 
filing of 26th Jan 1990 
Civil No. 900900523 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
This action is brought pursuant to authority given by Title 
14, chapter 1, Section 7 and Section 15, Liability of state or 
failure to obtain payment bond. Also, liability of the government 
to pay just compensation for property taken and used as provided by 
law of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ARTICLE V. 
I 
1. Plaintiff is an individual presently having residence at 1444 
Murphy's Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
Chancellor - Admitted 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
2. Plaintiff in his capacity of a professional engineer furnished 
designs used for three years for the railroad dumping and 
transporting of the vitro tailings in Utah's west desert; and, 
plaintiff did also do and provide many types of labor. 
C - without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
3. Likewise, plaintiff in his capacity of owning equipment 
furnished equipment for rail car dumping and mat'l transporting. 
C - Without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
4. Defendant through his contractor the Argee Corporation used 
plaintiff's design and equipment for some three years for moving 
the entire vitro tailings. C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
1 
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II 
5. Defendants Day and Alkema reside at the State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH at 288 North 
1460 West, P.O. Box 16690 Salt Lake City, Utah 16690-0690. 
Their attorney, defendant Fred Nelson is a staff attorney of the 
Utah Attorney General's office at the State Capital Building, 
County of Salt Lake. Peter Van Alstein is the Director of 
Divisions of Corporations and Commercial Code in the Wells Bldg at 
160 E 3rd South in Salt Lake] City. 
C - admitted, Hubbell - admits 
ALLEGATIONS AND COMPLAINTS 
6. Plaintiff's company PEMCO originally contracted the vitro 
equipment work. 
C - Without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
7. Shortly after starting, defendants contractor breached 
agreement by not making payment as contracted. 
C - Without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
8. Without payment, Pemco could not continue operating and the 
Argee-Pemco contract became void. 
C - Without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
9. After the breach, plaintiff personally contracted with Argee's 
manager Jack Adams to complete the work, and furthermore did 
completed work. 
C - Without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
10. Plaintiff should be paid for usage of his designs, equipment 
and labor, and to continue supplying to defendant to demobilize. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
11. Plaintiff gave notice to the State that their project did not 
have a good and sufficient payment bond, that plaintiff was not 
being paid, and that litigation would result. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
12. When plaintiff was seeking payment in July of 1985, the State 
did not have a good and sufficient payment bond applicable to this 
their project. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
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13. The project documents stated voiding requirements of a good 
and sufficient payment bond - (see voiding disclaimer). 
C - documents speak for themselves, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
14. Title 63, chapter 56, Sec. 38. requires that bonds necessary 
when contract is awarded. 
C - Code speaks for itself, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
15. A representation of a bond was made and used. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
16. The representation was fraudulent. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
17. Plaintiff complained to the State for recourse because of the 
State's not having a good and sufficient payment bond. 
C - admit plaintiff complained, deny bond not good & suf. 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
18. The State is liable to pay plaintiff by law because of their 
not having a good and sufficient payment bond as required per Title 
14, chapter 1, Sec. 7. Liability of public body for failure to 
obtain payment bond. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
19. The State is also liable to pay plaintiff by law per Title 14, 
chapter 1, Sec. 15. Liability of state or political subdivision 
failing to obtain bond* 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
20. Defendant told plaintiff that before plaintiff could obtain 
recourse of payment from defendant, plaintiff must seek recourse 
from defendant's contractor through legal channels of courts. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
21. Plaintiff followed defendants instructions, doing as defendant 
instructed. 
C - without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
22. Owner's representatives fraudulently instructed plaintiff to 
seek recourse from the Argee Corporation stating that they were not 
Peterson vs State of Utah 
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liable until plaintiff exhausted that recourse, 
C - without knowledge, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
23. But, by law the owner (State of Utah) was liable and their 
statements to plaintiff were fraudulent and misguiding to avoid the 
owner f s responsibilities. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
24. The defendant owner is liable to the defendant for damages for 
their fraudulent misguidance and misrepresentations when plaintiff 
sought for payment. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
25. This demand is proper and timely now in that the plaintiff 
contracted in writing, open ended, with Garth Wilson, to write of 
these problems to seek monies required to pay for costs of work. 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
26. Defendant was rightfully in requirement to pay costs of 
plaintiff's work when their contractor breached his obligation, 
said requirement is in writing by the original "Project Manual". 
CONTRACT pg 1-35, par 4: "In consideration of the foregoing 
premises, the Department agrees to pay to Contractor in the 
manner and in the amount provided in the said specifications 
and proposal." 
C - denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
27. The PERFORMANCE BOND section of the State's Vitro Project 
Manual cites (Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
further stating: 
"and all liabilities on this bond shall be determined in 
accordance with said provisions to the same extent as if it 
were copied at length herein." 
C - bond speaks for itself, denied 
Hubbell - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
28. Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 requires that 
if a subcontractor is not adequately paid by the general 
contractor which he is working for, then the State is obligated 
to pay the subcontractor for his costs of doing work. 
Note: The repealing of a section of law does not void its usage 
as wordage, definition, description and requirement, which the 
State used. C - Title speaks for itself, denied 
D - denies, no relation to Van Alstyne 
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29. Furthermore, the project "BOND" documents specifically 
exempt Argee from requirements of payment bonding and paying 
their subcontractors. 
"NOWf THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such 
that if the said Principal shall faithfully perform the 
contract in accordance with the plans, specifications, and 
conditions thereof, then this obligation shall be void: 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect." 
C - denied D - denies, no relation to Van Alstyne 
30. When this was brought to defendants attention by plaintiff, 
defendant said that they errored in their contracting with Argee. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
31. Later, effective 15th of August 1985, the Defendant changed 
his contract document "PAYMENT BOND" section. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
32. Changes to the contract document on the 15th of August 1985 
was done so as to have a good and sufficient payment bond. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
33. The effective date of the good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" 
in the contract began August 1985, nearly a month after plaintiff 
provided his initial work. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
34. No good and sufficient "PAYMENT BOND" was effective during 
when plaintiff was doing his initial work, for which he needs 
payment. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
35. Payment bonding requirement provisions were added to the 
"Project Contract" on August 15, 1989 after plaintiff brought 
notice of defendants deficiency to them. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
36. The "PROJECT MANUAL" contract documents effective during 
when plaintiff was doing his work required that defendant pay for 
work of plaintiff if defendant's contractor failed to make 
payment which is the condition. 
C - manual speaks for itself, denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
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37• When plaintiff complained to defendants, defendants 
instructed plaintiff to first seek payment from Argee through 
processes of the courts, 
C - denied, but admit informing of recourses 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
38. According to defendants instructions, plaintiff sought 
payment through the processes of the courts. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
39. In seeking payment, plaintiff was blamed for problems 
associated with the material being wet, not dryable. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
40. The dryabality problems were not known by plaintiff, but 
known by defendant, this but information was withheld by 
plaintiff. C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
41. The owner failed to inform its contractor Argee Corp or its 
engineer Peterson of owner's knowledge of the different 
conditions. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
42. Plaintiff was held liable for the information had only by 
the owner and withheld by the owner. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
43. Conditions that were encountered differed materially from 
those indicated, which engineer relied upon to his detriment, 
thus engineer Peterson is entitled to recover because the 
contract documents misrepresented conditions that would be 
encountered. Entitlement is based upon referenced law. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
44. The plaintiff was defamed in his industry and family, and 
still not paid. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
45. The defendant owner is responsible to the plaintiff for his 
costs, losses, and damages for their withholding of information. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
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46. If defendants claim this action by the plaintiff is not 
timely, then defendants instruction to the plaintiff were 
fraudulent. C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
47. According to law, plaintiff has properly notified defendant 
of his dilemma and losses giving "notice of claim." 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
48. The court in the "STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICE" 
is a "court having jurisdiction in the county in which the 
contract was performed and executed" per 14-1-7 and 14-1-15. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
49. Plaintiff made a proper claim and action in a court having 
jurisdiction in the county where plaintiff's labors (his 
technologies) and his equipment was being used. 
C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
50. Defendants are liable to plaintiff by default for their 
failure to answer. C - denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
51. The Peterson's family income had been only around $7,000 per 
year because of their business being crippled from not being paid 
for its work, thus they became vulnerable from outsiders. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
52. Evidently with a call from an attorney John P. Sampson and 
by his supposed letter, Sampson apparently persuaded State 
attorney Peter Van Alstein to disallow or remove previous filings 
of the board of directors of current record, which directors were 
of record of the initial filing of Peterson's corporation. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
53. The effect of Sampson's actions were to take control of 
plaintiff's business and give control to Sampson's clients Robert 
Mouritsen and John McSweeney who have repeatedly and fraudulently 
filed as officers and directors over the filing of Peterson and 
his lawfully initially registered directors to steal Peterson's 
and His family's business and properties. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
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54. Attorney John P. Sampson's in affidavit fraudulently claims 
to be attorney and representative for Riverside Machine and 
Fabrication (MAC Industries) back in June of 1986 and since. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
55. In contradiction, in the court of Judge John Rokich in 
affidavit attorney John P. Sampson states that he has never been 
attorney for Peterson or any of his businesses. 
C - without knowledge, therefore denied 
H - without sufficient knowledged, therefore denied 
56. Attorney Van Alstein for the State of Utah told Peterson 
that anyone at anytime can come to his division and file 
themselves as officers and directors of any corporation on file 
in the state of Utah. 
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied 
H - denies the allegations 
57. State Attorney Van Alstein has no basis for removing filed 
documents. 
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied 
H - denies the allegations 
58. The defendant's operation of his Corporations and Commercial 
Code Division allowed the invasion of others into and over 
plaintiff's business. 
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied 
H - denies the allegations 
59. The defendant's attorney Peter Van Alstein intervened and 
canceled plaintiff's proper and lawful filings of his business 
posturing his company for a fraudulent takeover allowable and 
possible because of unlawful actions and bad operation code of 
the defendant's (The State of Utah). 
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied 
H - denies the allegations 
60. The defendant is thus liable to the plaintiff for his 
overturned taking of his business and properties, property he was 
deprived of, without due process of law guaranteed to him by 
ARTICLE V of the Constitution and taken without the right of 
trial jury preserved to him by ARTICLE VII of the Constitution. 
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied 
H - denies the allegations 
61. Attorney Van Alstein further stated that he would welcome a 
law suite in this matter to obtain decisions of how to deal with 
this perpetual problem relating to paper thievery of Utah 
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Corporations. 
C - to be answered by Van Alstyne, wrongdoing denied 
H - denies the allegations 
ENTITLEMENT 
62. Peterson has lost 1/4 million dollars in direct costs not 
paid for in providing equipment and technology to move the Vitro 
tailings and additional costs of six million dollars for losses 
to his businesses and additional costs of ten million dollars for 
damages to his children and marriage. 
C - denied 
H - denies the allegations 
III 
Wherefore, plaintiff prays as follows: 
63. A temporary restraining order issued restraining defendant, 
his servants, and employees, form selling plaintiff's equipment. 
64. A preliminary injunction issue enjoining defendant, his 
servants, and employees, from using plaintiff's designs and 
equipment without paying plaintiff for his cost of providing said 
designs and equipment. 
65. That the court enforce a default judgment for defendant's 
failure to answer plaintiff's claims of January 6th of 1989. 
66. That the court finds defendants in default for not providing 
a timely good and sufficient payment bond as required by law. 
67. On a final hearing, defendant, his agents, servants, and 
employees be permanently enjoined from ever using plaintiff's 
designs and equipment without paying plaintiff for his cost of 
providing said designs and equipment. 
68. That plaintiff receive costs and expenses incurred in this 
action. 
67. That the plaintiff receive entitlement for damages for 
defendant's withholding of information detriment to plaintiff. 
That the plaintiff receive entitlement for the* fraudulent 
representations of conditions and bonding of the defendant. 
70. That Plaintiff receive such other additional relief as the 
court deems proper. 
Certified in affidavit as true and thus dated this th day 
o£ May 1 9 9
° - (JlvU-DM=-
William D. Peterson 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312) 
Attorney General 
Melissa Hubbell (#5090) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
130 Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1019 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Mark S. Day, Fred 
Kenneth L. Alkema 
Peter Van Alstyne 
Defendants. 
Nelson ] 
i ANSWER of Division of 
i Corporations and Commercial 
i Code, Department of Commerce 
i Peter Van Alstyne 
i Civil No. 900-90053 
i Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
Defendant, Peter Alstyne in his capacity as Director of 
the Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code, ("Department of Commerce"), by and through 
counsel, Melissa M. Hubbell, Assistant Attorney General, answers 
Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Division responds to the specific allegations of 
Plaintiff's complaint as follows. 
1. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge and 
information to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the 
Plaintiff's complaint and therefore denies the same. Furthermore, 
these particular allegations relate specifically to allegations 
against defendants Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson and Kenneth L. Alkema 
and the same will be answered by them in a separate response. 
2. Defendant admits to the allegations contained in 
paragraph 5. 
6. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 28 and 29 of the plaintiff's complaint. Furthermore, 
these particular allegations have no relation to the complaint 
against Peter Van Alstyne who is being sued on behalf of the 
Division. 
7. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge and 
information to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, and 
55 of the Plaintiff's complaint and therefore denies the same. 
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Furthermore, these particular allegations relate specifically to 
allegations against defendants Mark S, Day, Fred Nelson and 
Kenneth L. Alkema and the same will be answered by them in a 
separate response. 
8. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62 of the plaintiff's 
complaint. 
GENERAL DENIAL 
Defendants, and each of them, deny each and every 
allegation of plaintiff's complaint not expressly admitted in 
this answer. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
SECOND DEFENSE 
This court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the plaintiff's claims against the defendants. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Governmental 
Notice of Claim provisions, which is a condition precedent to 
filing this action. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Defendant, the State of Utah, has not waived its 
sovereign immunity and, accordingly, plaintiff's claims for 
relief are barred. 
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SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action, and each of them, 
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, as a party to previously settled lawsuits 
involving the same issues that are alleged in this action, is 
collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action are barred by the 
equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and/or laches. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Any contractual claims against any or all defendants 
asserted by the plaintiff, which claims defendants specifically 
deny, are barred because there is no privity of contract between 
the plaintiff and the defendants. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a default 
judgment for claims he made against the defendants in an 
administrative action before the State Office of Rescovery 
Services (see paras. 48-50 of the plaintiff's complaint). 
Plaintiff has previously alleged these same claims in other 
pleadings and has been informed by various judges that the Office 
of Recovery Services conducts administrative hearings and has no 
jurisdiction to entertain the claims alleged by the plaintiff. 
In addition, plaintiff also alleges claims of fraud and 
defamation against the defendants. These claims are without 
- 4 -
merit and have not been brought or asserted in good faith and, as 
a result, the defendants are entitled to award of attorneys' fees 
for defending such claims pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56. (1953, as amended). 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint, the 
defendants requests that said claims be dismissed and the relief 
prayed for by the plaintiff be denied, and that the defendants be 
awarded their costs, attorneys fees and such other relief as the 
court may deem appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on this^ day of June, 1990. 
MeljLissa M r HubbeTl ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this U day of June, 1990, I 
caused to be mailed via United States Postal Service, first 
class, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
ANSWER, first class, postage prepaid, to: 
William D. Peterson 
c/o Paul E. Peterson 
1444 Murphy's Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801)775 -1483, 485-9011 
Plaintiffs 
M&niss^M. Hubbell 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM, USB #3312 
Attorney General 
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. PETERSON, ANSWER OF STATE OF UTAH, 
: MARK S. DAY, FRED NELSON 
Plaintiff, AND KENNETH L. ALKEMA 
: 
v. 
Civil No. 900900523 
THE STATE OF UTAH, MARK S. DAY, : 
FRED NELSON, KENNETH L. ALKEMA 
PETER VAN ALSTYNE, : Judge L. H. RUSSON 
Defendants. : 
Comes now defendants, the State of Utah; Mark S. Day in 
his capacity as Project Manager, UMTRA Projects, Bureau of 
Radiation Control, Utah Department of Health; Fred Nelson, in his 
capacity as Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah; and 
Kenneth L. Alkema, in his capacity as Director of Environmental 
Health, Utah Department of Health and answers Plaintiff's 
Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendants answer, admit and deny the specific 
averments of plaintiff's complaint as follows: 
1. Paragraph 1 is admitted 
2. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraphs 
2 and 3 and the same are therefore denied. 
3. Paragraph 4 is denied. 
4. Paragraph 5 is admitted. 
5. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraph 
6 and the same are therefore denied. 
6. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraphs 
7 through 9 and the same are therefore denied. 
7. Paragraphs 10 through 12 are denied. 
8. The project documents for the Vitro Tailings 
Project speaks for themselves and to the extent that paragraph 13 
is inconsistent with those documents, the same is denied. 
9. Utah Code Annotated S 63-56-38 (1953, as amended) 
speaks for itself and to the extent that paragraph 14 is 
inconsistent with the statute, the same is denied. 
10. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraph 
15 and the same is therefore denied. 
11. Paragraph 16 is denied. 
12. Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 17 
that they did not have a good and sufficient payment bond but 
admit that plaintiff complained to the State. 
13. Paragraphs 18 through 20 are denied. 
14. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged in 
paragraphs 21 and 22 and the same are therefore denied. 
15. Paragraphs 23 through 26 are denied. 
16. The performance bond for the Vitro Tailings 
Project speaks for itself and to the extent that the plaintiff's 
characterizations in paragraph 27 are inconsistent with the 
language of the performance bond, the same are denied. 
17. Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
speaks for itself and, accordingly, defendants deny plaintiff's 
characterizations in paragraph 28. 
18. Paragraphs 29 through 35 are denied. 
19. The Project Manual for the Vitro Tailings Project 
speaks for itself and any characterizations made by the plaintiff 
in paragraph 36 are denied. 
20. Paragraph 37 is denied but defendants admit that 
they informed plaintiff that his recourse was against the 
contractor, Argee Corporation, and the bonding companies. 
21. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged in 
paragraphs 38 and 39 and the same are therefore denied. 
22. Paragraph 40 through 50 are denied. 
23. Defendants are without knowledge sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the matter alleged in paragraphs 
51 through 55 and the same are therefore denied. 
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24. Paragraphs 56 through 61 relate specifically to 
allegations against defendant Peter Van Alstyne and the same will 
be answered by Mr. Van Alstyne under a separate response and to 
the extent that the allegations in paragraphs 56 through 61 
charge the defendants answering herein with wrongdoing or 
liability the same are denied. 
25. Paragraph 62 is denied. 
GENERAL DENIAL 
Defendants, and each of them, deny each and every 
allegation of plaintiff's complaint not expressly admitted in 
this Answer. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
plaintiff's claims against the defendants. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiff fails to state claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with the governmental 
Notice of Claim provisions, which is a condition precedent to 
filing this action. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Defendant, the State of Utah, has not waived its 
sovereign immunity and, accordingly, plaintiff's claims for 
relief are barred. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action, and each of them, 
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, as a party to previously settled lawsuits 
involving the same issues that are alleged in this action, is 
collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action, 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's alleged causes of action are barred by the 
equitable doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and/or laches. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Any contractual claims against any or all defendants 
asserted by the plaintiff, which claims defendants specifically 
deny, are barred because there is no privity of contract between 
plaintiff and the defendants. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a default 
judgment for claims he made against the defendants in an 
administrative action before the State of Utah Office of Recovery 
Service (see paras. 48-50 of plaintiff's complaint). Plaintiff 
has previously alleged these same claims in other pleadings and 
has been informed by various judges that the Office of Recovery 
Services conducts administrative hearings and has no jurisdiction 
to entertain the claims alleged by the plaintiff. In addition, 
plaintiff also alleges claims of fraud and defamation against the 
defendants. These claims are without merit and have not been 
- R -
brought or asserted in good faith and, as a result, defendants 
are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for defending such 
claims pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) § 78-27-56. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint, the 
defendants request that said claims be dismissed and the relief 
prayed for be denied, and that the defendants be awarded their 
costs, attorneys fees and such other relief as the court may deem 
appropriate. ^ 
DATED this ty^ day of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL. VAN DAM 
Utah/Attorney G 
Denise Ch 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
Answer of the State of Utah, Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson and Kenneth 
L. Alkema was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to William D. 
Peterson, c/o Paul E. Peterson, 1444 Murphy's Lane, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106. 
DATED this A ^ day of June, 1990. 
Denise Chajrcellor 
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Peterson vs State of Utah 
July 9, 1990 
William D. Peterson 
c/o Paul E. Peterson 
1444 Murphy's Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801)485-9011, 278-3435 
file: \legal\state\Int-reql 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
William D. Peterson 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
The State of Utah 
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson 
Kenneth L. Alkema 
Peter Van Alstein 
Defendants 
Plaintiff's First Request 
for 
Written Interrogatories 
Civil No. 900900523 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hereby submits the following Interrogatories to be 
answered by defendants, and each of them, under oath, within 20 
days of the receipt of the same. 
APPENDIX "A" 
A. "Identify" all sources of your answers. 
B. As used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as 
applied to a person (as defined) means to state his name, business 
and residence address, occupation, job title, and if not an 
individual, the type of entity and the address of its principal 
place of business, or government. 
C. As used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as 
applied to a document means to state the type of document (letter, 
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memorandum, etc.), the identity of the author or originator, the 
date authored or originated, the identify of each person to whom 
the original or a copy was addressed or delivered, the identity of 
such person known or reasonably believed by you to have present 
possession, custody, or control thereof, and a brief description of 
the subject matter thereof. 
D. As used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as 
applied to a communication means to state the date of the 
communication, the type of communication (telephone conversation, 
meeting, etc.), the place where the communication took place, the 
identity of the person who made the communication, the identity of 
each person who received the communication, and of each person 
present when it was made, and the subject matter discussed. 
E. As used in these Interrogatories, the term "identify" as 
applied to a meeting means to state the date of the meeting, the 
place of the meeting, each person invited to attend, each person 
who attended, ad the subject matter discussed. 
F. Omissions. The failure to state, identify or describe 
any fact, person, document or other item of information called by 
any of these interrogatories in your responses thereto shall be 
deemed a representation that such fact, person, document or other 
item of information as not known to you. 
G. Witnesses and Relevant documents. For each answer to 
each interrogatory (1) identify each person known to you who has 
knowledge of the facts supporting your answer and (2) identify each 
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document containing information in support of your answer to each 
interrogatory. 
H. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery* In answering 
to the plaintiff's complaints, the defendant repeatedly stated that 
he was without knowledge• This answer was given even in many 
instances where the defendant is the legal receiver, approver, and 
record keeper of said documents. Further failure to cooperate in 
providing answers, even in this and future discovery will be 
considered a failure to answer per Rule 37 (a) (3). 
INTERROGATORIES 
Answer, identify, and explain your answer to the following: 
Records of the court of Judge Bruce Jenkins clearly show and 
Argee Admitted, even counterclaimed the problems for the way the 
equipment operated with the overly wet tailings material, the state 
of Utah also charged Peterson for not removing his equipment used, 
yet in answer to complaint 2. the defendant denied knowledge that 
Peterson furnished said equipment. Attorney John P. Sampson has 
been a long time friend and attorney for Robert Mouritsen and John 
McSweeney who are thieves of properties from Peterson. In conflict 
of interest, Mouritsen and McSweeney caused Sampson to be attorney 
for Peterson. Sampson exerted duress and fraud coercing Peterson 
to supposedly unlawfully settle the Argee matter befor.e Judge 
Jenkins for payment for Peterson's RR car dumper. Settlement was 
illegal and payment to him for his work has never been made. 
1. Why does not Peterson still retain legal ownership of the RR 
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car dumper at Clive in view of his work provided, and supposed 
settlement to him for his work? 
2. How did the state of Utah get their claimed ownership of the 
RR-car dumper at Clive? 
3. How long was Peterson's rail car dumper system used in moving 
the Vitro tailings? 
4. When the plaintiff was not paid, he complained of not being 
paid for his work to the state's attorney Fred Nelson, the state's 
engineer Mark Day, and even directly to governor Norm Bangerter, by 
a letter, which prompted a reply. What knowledge do the above 
three have of the plaintiff's then complaints and what did they do 
and what did they inform the plaintiff were his recourses? 
5. Part of plaintiff complaint above was informing the defendant 
that his bond was faulty. What changes were made in the bond 
documents after the plaintiff's complaint in July of 1985? 
6. The payment bond document of 4th of Jan 1985 was referenced 
per (Title 14, Chapter 1, Sec. 5, U.C.A. 1953 as Amended) having 
paragraphs stating the following: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is such that 
if the said Principal shall faithfully perform the contract in 
accordance with the plans, specifications, and conditions 
thereof, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise to 
remain in full force and effect. 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this bond is executed pursuant to the 
provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, and all liabilities on this bond to all such 
claimants shall be determined in accordance with said 
provisions to the same extent as if it were copied at length 
herein. 
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a) Bond documents dated 15th of August 1985 were added to the 
project manual nearly eight months after start of the contract 
referencing (Title 63, Chapter 56 U.C.A,m 1953 as Amended) 
instead of Title 14, Chapter 1 above. 
b) In the payment bond document of 15th of August 1985 the 
following was replaced: if the said Principal shall faithfully 
perform the contract in accordance with the plans, 
specifications, and conditions thereof 
the above was replaced with: 
Principal shall pay all claimants supplying labor or materials 
to him or his subcontractors. 
Is it true that the above changes were made? 
7. What knowledge does the defendant have of changes to payment 
bond documents after initial contracting in January of 1985, and 
why were the changes made? 
8. Does the plaintiff have entitlement per Title 14, Chapter 1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as stated in the payment bond document 
dated the 4th of January 1985? 
9. What entitlement to payment do the defendants bond documents 
indicate that the plaintiff have coming if he provided RR car dump 
equipment but was not paid as he claims. 
10. What was the good and sufficient payment bond applicable to 
their project which the defendant had when they initially started 
contracted as they were required to have by law. 
11. Why did not the disclaimer as indicated in 6 above make the 
payment obligations void as the paragraph states. 
12. Why is the defendant not required to pay plaintiff's costs per 
Title 14, chapter 1, Sec. 7 or otherwise? 
13. Why were the payment bond changes of August 15th 1985 made? 
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14. If Argee did indeed "faithfully perform the contract in 
accordance with the plans, specifications, and conditions thereof, 
then was their payment bond requirement indeed void as the signed 
agreement stated. 
15. The Argee Corporation received around five million dollars 
from the State for increased costs in view that the tailings were 
not dryable as the basic contract indicated. What information was 
had by the State of Utah relative to the wetness or dryability of 
the tailings and which information was not given to Argee upon 
their initially obtaining the contract in January of 1985. 
16. Was it true that the Argee Corporation found that the State 
did have wetness or dryability of the tailings information which 
the State failed to provide to Argee upon their contracting? 
Explain the basis for Argee being paid for additional costs to ship 
the material wetter that anticipated. 
17. What knowledge does the defendant have that the plaintiff, the 
provider of equipment to move the tailings was informed of the 
additional requirement due to the additional wetness? 
18. According to the same entitlement of Argee Corp, why should 
not the plaintiff be also entitled to his additional cost incurred 
due to information being withheld from him, which also incurred to 
him additional costs for which he was not paid? 
19. Argee referenced laws and the plaintiff also referenced laws 
which give entitlement to him for the defendants failure to provide 
information which it had but withheld to the detriment of its 
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subcontractors• As Argee had entitlement per the referenced law, 
why does not the plaintiff also have entitlement per the referenced 
law? 
20. The plaintiff has made claim in lawful courts of the State 
Utah. The defendant has made claim that this action is not in the 
proper court of jurisdiction. Would the defendant explain its 
basis of this claim, even its contention with its referenced 
contract laws Title 14 and Title 63 in which is quoted "court 
having jurisdiction in the county in which the contract was 
performed and executed per 14-1-7 and 14-1-15? 
21. Title 14 and Title 63 law specifically express plaintiff's 
right for payment in the event he is not paid and in the event the 
payment bond is not proper. Why does the defendant have any 
sovereign immunity or any barring of this action in view of its 
usage of laws referenced which specifically give entitlement to the 
plaintiff? Explain any basis it has for immunity. 
22. Explain all basis the plaintiff could be paid his costs 
according to defendant's requirements to insure that he is paid, 
including defendant's payment bond commitments as required by law 
or any other basis, as for any provider of work who is not paid. 
23. Why should not the plaintiff be paid in view of ARTICLE V of 
the Constitution of the United States? 
24. Give any reasons why the plaintiff should be not paid 
according ARTICLE V of the above and explain why reasons of not 
being paid are not un-constitutional? 
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23. Is the courts of the Office of Recovery Services a legitimate 
organization and have jurisdiction in the State of Utah? 
24. Can the judges of the Office of Recovery Services hold 
hearings of complaint? 
25. Can those called into attending hearings of complaints at the 
courts of the Office of Recovery make claims, or have a defense, 
and in defending, can defendants make statements, claims, 
counterclaims etc? 
24. Wm Peterson founded Riverside Machine and Fabrication wrote 
and filed its articles of incorporation. Wm Peterson was and is 
its owner. By its board of directors, Riverside Machine and 
Fabrication was merged into Peterson Product Engineering & 
Manufacturing Company. These papers are on file at Utah's 
Divisions of Corporations. Approvals of the corporations filings 
are display director Peter Van Alstein's signature. What do the 
defendant's filings show? If there are any differences, what are 
they? 
25. According to John P. Sampson, Robert Mouritsen, and John 
McSweeney, John P. Sampson was this plaintiff's attorney. The 
Board of Directors of Riverside Machine and Fabrications filed 
affidavits declaring conflictive interest of attorney Sampson where 
he has been representing both sides. Attorney Satmpson ha.s never 
resigned from representing Peterson and his company where in the 
court of Judge John Rokich, Peterson has requested that Sampson 
explain his activities and positions and that he resign from his 
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representation of Peterson and his company. Sampson has stated 
that he no longer represents Peterson but he has not explained when 
this representation discontinued. In the view of director Peter 
Van Alstein who has rights to determine for Riverside Machine and 
Fabrication, Wm Peterson who its owner and his founding board of 
directors, or interfering attorney John P. Sampson and his thieving 
colleagues Robert Mouritsen and John McSweeney? 
26. By what basis of rules or law is defendant director Peter Van 
Alstein able to remove lawfully and properly filed documents of 
record which determine ownership and control of the business? 
27. By what basis of rules or law is defendant director Peter Van 
Alstein able to remove the lawfully and properly filed document of 
merger of Peterson's business Riverside Machine and Fabrication? 
28. Of a business owner, or his conflictive and thieving attorney, 
which, the owner or his counsel, have last rights in directing the 
matters of the owners business? 
29. In the control of a business, without consent or knowledge of 
the existing board of directors, can outside parties elect 
themselves as the board of directors, make and issue company stock 
to themselves, then record themselves as being the lawful board of 
directors and owners of the business? 
30. Is the policy of defendant director Peter Van Alstein to allow 
fraudulent thieving business takeovers by the method above and by 
the means the defendant director Van Alstein has been allowing to 
Mouritsen, McSweeney, and Sampson? 
9 
Peterson vs State of Utah 
July 9, 1990 
31. Instead of aiding one side or interfering with the other, 
would it not be better, even more legal, for the defendant's office 
of corporations to not take sides, not change filings, and allow 
conflicting parties to settle their differences in a court of law? 
32. In the immediate matter, has not the defendant director Van 
Alstein taken sides with plaintiff's conflictive attorney making 
defendant additionally liable for plaintiff's losses? Defendant's 
position needs to be declared and justified by its law. 
33. Copies of plaintiff's filings bearing the approving signature 
of their filings are included. Defendant Van Alstein's position 
needs to be declared and justified by its law as to plaintiff's 
rights and the current status of his filings. 
Dated this S th day of July 1990. 
William D. Peterson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's First Request for Written Interrogatories 
was served, 
to: 
The State of Utah .*
 A 
Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson y~40~&7 h\tyXH~ 
Kenneth L. Alkema,
 y - . •> ^  ^ 4 "u, 
Peter Van Alstein /< / / " o<> /> fv /c /^ 
^ 7-2- 96 fop*^ 
this y day of July, 1990, by delivery to their attorney: the 
office of Utah Attorney General, Paul VanDam, State Capital 
Building, County of Salt Lake. 
William D. Peterson 
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Attorney General 
DENISE CHANCELLOR, USB #5452 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1017 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• 
WILLIAM D. PETERSON, DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO 
Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
: OF INTERROGATORIES 
v. : 
Civil No, 900900523 
THE STATE OF UTAH, MARK S. DAY, : 
FRED NELSON, KENNETH L. ALKEMA 
PETER VAN ALSTYNE, : Judge L. H. RUSSON 
Defendants. * 
Defendants, the State of Utah, Mark S. Day, Fred Nelson 
and Kenneth L. Alkema hereby submits the following Responses and 
Objections to Plaintiff William D. Peterson's First Set of 
Interrogatories• 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Defendants object to the instructions contained in 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on the grounds and to 
the extent that they request or purport to impose upon the 
defendants any obligation to respond in a manner or scope beyond 
the requirements set forth in Rules 26-37 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's instructions are vague, overbroad, 
unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
2. Defendants object to Instruction B to the extent 
it requires disclosure of the home address of employees or former 
employees of the State. 
3. Defendants object to plaintiff's inflammatory 
introductory statement setting forth purported facts, for the 
most part unrelated to the defendants. The defendants have no 
information or belief as to the truth of the matters asserted and 
to the extent that an admission is requested, the same is denied. 
This introductory language is argumentative, not in accord with 
discovery rules or practice and is an abuse of the discovery 
process. 
4. Defendants object that plaintiff has failed to 
sequentially number his interrogatories, where there are 
duplicate-numbered interrogatories, defendants will refer to the 
interrogatory by number as well as the page number where the 
interrogatory appears in plaintiff's document. 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 1: why does not Peterson still 
retain legal ownership of the RR car dumper at Clive in view of 
his work provided, and supposed settlement to him for his work? 
Response to InterroQatory »n. i. Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope 
of discovery under Rule 26 Utah R. Civ. P.,
 i s not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and, 
furthermore, calls for a conclusion of law. 
Interrogatory No, 2: How did the state of Utah get 
their claimed ownership of the RR-car dumper at Clive? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 2; The State of Utah 
responds that it acquired the railroad car dumper under a 
settlement agreement with Argee Corporation. 
Interrogatory No. 3: How long was Peterson's rail car 
dumper system used in moving the Vitro tailings? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 3: Defendants have no 
information or belief that the railroad dumper system was owned 
by Mr. Peterson. With the foregoing limitation, defendants 
respond that the railroad dumper system that the State contracted 
with Argee Corporation to operate was in place at Clive from 
approximately June 1985 until March 1987. 
Interrogatory No. 4: When the plaintiff was not paid, 
he complained of not being paid for his work to the state's 
attorney Fred Nelson, the state's engineer Mark Day, and even 
directly to governor Norm Bangerter, by a letter, which prompted 
a reply. What knowledge do the above three have of the 
plaintiff's then complaints and what did they do and what did 
they inform the plaintiff were his recourses? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 4: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is vague and overbroad. 
Defendants also object to the phrase "[w]hen the plaintiff was 
not paid" on the grounds that plaintiff fails to state with 
particularity who had purportedly failed to pay him. Without 
waiving these objections, defendants respond as follows: 
(a) Fred Nelson recalls a conversation with Mr. 
Peterson whereby Mr. Nelson told Mr. Peterson that he did not 
have a contractual relationship with the State and that his 
recourse was against the contractor, Argee Corporation. 
(b) Mark Day responds that he told Mr. Peterson that 
the State had a valid payment bond and that his business was not 
with the State but with the contractor, Argee, and/or the bonding 
company. 
(c) The Governor's Office has a letter on file from 
Mr. Peterson dated December 29, 1987 and a response thereto dated 
January 19, 1988. If there has been any correspondence earlier 
than the foregoing date it has been archived and access thereto 
would be unreasonably burdensome. If Mr. Peterson has 
corresponded with or had correspondence from the Governor's 
Office prior to December 1987, he may more easily obtain copies 
of this correspondence from his files. 
Interrogatory No. 5t Part of plaintiff(sic) complaint 
above was informing the defendant that his bond was faulty. What 
changes were made in the bond documents after the plaintiff's 
complaint in July of 1985? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 5: Defendants object to 
the assertion in plaintiff's interrogatory that the State changed 
its bond documents as a result of plaintiff's purported July 1985 
complaint. The State responds that any changes to the bond 
documents are reflected in the documents on file with the Utah 
Department of Health, where they are available for inspection and 
copying. 
Interrogatory No* 6: The payment bond document of 4th 
of Jan 1985 was referenced per (Title 14, Chapter 1, Sec. 5, 
U.C.A. 1953 as Amended) having paragraphs stating the following: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of this obligation is 
such that if the said Principal shall faithfully 
perform the contract in accordance with the plans, 
specifications, and conditions thereof, then this 
obligation shall be void; otherwise to remain in full 
force and effect. 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this bond is executed pursuant 
to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, and all liabilities on this 
bond to all such claimants shall be determined in 
accordance with said provisions to the same extent as 
if it were copied at length herein. 
(a) Bond documents dated 15th of August 1985 were added to 
the project manual nearly eight months after start of 
the contract referencing (Title 63, Chapter 56 U.C.A. 
1953 as amended) instead of Title 14, Chapter 1 above. 
(b) In payment bond document of 15th of August 1985 the 
following was replaced: if the said Principal shall 
faithfully perform the contract in accordance with the 
plans, specifications, and conditions thereof 
the above was replaced with: 
Principal shall pay all claimants supplying labor or 
materials to him of his subcontractors. 
Is it true that the above changes were made? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 6. Plaintiff is referred 
to the bond documents on file with the Utah Department of Health 
where they are available for inspection and copying . 
Interrogatory No. 7: What knowledge does the defendant 
have of changes to payment bond documents after initial 
contracting in January of 1985, and why were the changes made? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 7: Defendants refer the 
plaintiff to defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 5. In 
addition, the State responds that some changes to the bond 
documents were made to correct clerical errors. 
Interrogatory No. 8; Does the plaintiff have 
entitlement per Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
stated in the payment bond document dated the 4th of January 
1985? 
Response to Interrogatory •». p. Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope 
of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
Interrogatory No. 9: What entitlement to payment does 
the defendants(sic) bond documents indicate that the plaintiff 
have coming if he provided RR car dump equipment but was not paid 
as he claims. 
Response to Interrogatory nn. q. Defendants object to 
Interrogatory No. 9 on the grounds that the question is 
speculative, calls for a hypothetical response, and is not within 
the scope of the rules of discovery. Defendants refer plaintiff 
to their objection in response to Interrogatory No. 3. 
Interrogatory No. 10: what was the good and sufficient 
payment bond applicable to their project which the defendant had 
when they initially started contracted(sic) as they were required 
to have by law. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 10; Plaintiff is 
referred to the documents on file with the Utah Department of 
Health, which are available for inspection and copying. 
Interrogatory No. 11; why did not the disclaimer as 
indicated in 6 above make the payment obligations void as the 
paragraph states. 
Response to Interrogatory No, 11: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope 
of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, asks defendants to 
render a legal opinion to the plaintiff. 
Interrogatory No, 12: Why is the defendant not 
required to pay plaintiff's costs per Title 14, chapter 1, Sec. 7 
or otherwise? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is duplicative, is not 
within the scope of discovery and, furthermore, calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
Interrogatory No. 13: Why were the payment bond 
changes of August 15th 1985 made? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 13: This interrogatory 
is duplicative of Interrogatory No. 7. Accordingly, defendants 
refer plaintiff to their response to Interrogatory No. 7. 
Interrogatory No. 14: If Argee did indeed "faithfully 
perform the contract in accordance with the plans, 
specifications, and conditions thereof, then was their payment 
bond requirement indeed void as the signed agreement stated. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 14: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope 
of discovery, is vague, overbroad, speculative and calls for a 
hypothetical response. In addition, plaintiff requests 
defendants to render a legal opinion. 
Interrogatory No. 15: The Argee Corporation received 
around five million dollars from the State for increased costs in 
view that the tailings were not dryable as the basic contract 
indicated. What information was had by the State of Utah 
relative to the wetness or dryability of the tailings and which 
information was not given to Argee upon their initially obtaining 
the contract in January 1985. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 15; Defendants object to 
plaintiff's premise, contained in the first sentence of this 
interrogatory, that Argee Corporation was paid moneys, in 
addition to the contract price, because of the moisture content 
of the tailings. Defendants also object to plaintiff's assertion 
that Argee was not given information as to the moisture content 
of the tailings when it obtained the contract. Without waiving 
the foregoing objections, defendants respond that any information 
that the defendants had with respect to the moisture content of 
the tailings was contained in the bid documents and in the files 
at the Health Department, which are available for inspection. 
Interrogatory No. 16: Was it true that the Argee 
Corporation found that the State did have wetness or dryability 
of tailings information which the State failed to provide to 
Argee upon their contracting? Explain the basis for Argee being 
paid for additional costs to ship the material wetter than 
anticipated. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 16: Defendants repeat 
their response to Interrogatory No. 15 and objections contained 
therein. In addition, defendants respond that one of the 
conditions of the bid for the Vitro project was that each bidder 
was required to make an independent verification of site 
conditions and that bid information distributed by the Health 
Department was no substitute for such independent verification. 
Defendants respond to the last sentence of plaintiff's 
interrogatory that Argee Corporation was paid funds in addition 
to the contract price to settle an arbitration dispute. 
Interrogatory No. 17: What knowledge does the 
defendant have that the plaintiff, the provider of equipment to 
move the tailings[,] was informed of the additional requirement 
due to the additional wetness? 
Response to Interrogatory No. 17; Defendants object to 
Interrogatory No. 17 on the following grounds: 
(a) The defendants object to the statement "the 
plaintiff [was] the provider of equipment to move the tailings" 
in Interrogatory No. 17 as overbroad and ambiguous. Defendants 
reiterate their objection contained in response to Interrogatory 
No. 3. 
(b) Defendants also object to the statement "was 
informed of the additional requirement due to the additional 
wetness" as vague and overbroad and does not state with 
reasonable particularity a question which defendants can 
reasonably answer. 
Without having waived the above objections, defendants, 
to the best of their information and belief, do not know what 
plaintiff was informed of as to the moisture content of the 
tailings. 
Interrogatory No. 18: According to the same 
entitlement of Argee Corp, why should not the plaintiff be also 
entitled to his additional cost incurred due to information being 
withheld from him, which also incurred to him additional costs 
for which he was not paid? 
Response to Interrogatory wn. ia. Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is not within the scope 
of discovery under Rule 26 Utah R. Civ. P.,
 i s not reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and, 
furthermore, calls for a conclusion of law. 
interrogatory No. 19: Argee referenced laws and the 
plaintiff also referenced laws which give entitlement to him for 
the defendants failure to provide information which had but 
withheld to the detriment of its subcontractors. As Argee had 
entitlement per the referenced law, why does not plaintiff also 
have entitlement per the referenced law? 
Response to Interrogatory w». io. Defendants object to 
this interrogatory as duplicative, vague, ambiguous, not within 
the scope of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, calls for a 
legal conclusion. 
Interrogatory No. 20: The plaintiff has made claim in 
lawful courts of the State Utah. The defendant has made claim 
that this action is not in the proper court of jurisdiction. 
Would the defendant explain its basis of this claim, even its 
contention with its referenced contract laws Title 14 and Title 
63 in which is quoted "court having jurisdiction in the county in 
which the contract was performed and executed per 14-1-7 and 14-
1-15? 
Response to Interrogatory No* 20: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it vague and ambiguous/ is 
not within the scope of the rules of discovery and, furthermore, 
calls for the defendants to give legal advice to the plaintiff. 
Interrogatory No. 21: Title 14 and Title 63 law 
specifically express plaintiff's right for payment in the event 
he is not paid and in the event the payment bond is not proper. 
Why does the defendant have any sovereign immunity or any barring 
of this action in view of its usage of laws referenced which 
specifically give entitlement to this plaintiff? Explain any 
basis it has for immunity. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 21: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory on the grounds that it is ambiguous, vague, 
overbroad, not within the scope of discovery, and, furthermore, 
calls for a conclusion of law. 
Interrogatory No. 22: Explain all basis the plaintiff 
could be paid his costs according to defendant's requirements to 
insure that he is paid, including defendant's payment bond 
commitments as required by law or any other basis, as for any 
provider of work who is not paid. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 22: Defendants object to 
this interrogatory as ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, and not 
within the scope of the rules of discovery. Furthermore, this 
interrogatory requests defendants to render legal advice to the 
plaintiff. 
Interrogatory No. 23 [p.7]: Why should not the 
plaintiff be paid in view of ARTICLE V of the Constitution of 
the United States? 
Response to Interrogatory „n „
 [p.7]. D e f e n d a n t 8 
object to this interrogatory as overbroad, not within the bounds 
of discovery, and, furthermore, calls for a conclusion of law. 
interrogatory No.
 ? 4 [ p . 7 ] , Give any reasons why the ^  
plaintiff should be not paid according ARTICLE V of the above and 
explain why reasons of not being paid are not unconstitutional? 
Response to Interrogatory
 W. OA [p.7]s Defendants 
object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overbroad, 
not within the scope of discovery, and, furthermore, calls for a 
legal conclusion. 
interrogatory No. 23 [p.8]: is the courts(sic) of the 
Office of Recovery Services a legitimate organization and have 
jurisdiction in the State of Utah? 
Response to Interrogatory MO „
 [p.8]. P l a i n t i f f ig 
referred to Utah Code Annotated Title 62A, Chapter 11, for the 
statutory authority of the Office of Recovery Services. 
Interrogatory No. ?4 [p.8]: Can the judges of the 
Office of Recovery Services hold hearings of complaint? 
Response to Interrogatory »n ->A [p.8]: P l a i n t i f f i s 
referred to defendants response to Interrogatory No. 23 [p.8]. 
interrogatory No. ?s [p.8]: Can those called into 
attending hearings of complaints at the court of the Office of 
Recovery(sic) make claims, or have a defense, and in defending, 
can defendants make statements, claims, counterclaims etc? 
Response to Interrogatory M„ ->K
 [ p # 8 ] | P l a l n t i £ £ ig 
referred to defendants response to Interrogatory No. 23 [p.8]. 
Interrogatories No* 24-33 rpp*8-101 and response 
thereto; These interrogatories are addressed to defendant Peter 
VanAlstyne and will be answered under separate response by him. 
The other defendants have no information or belief as to the 
matters asserted in Interrogatories No. 24-33 [pp-8-10] and to 
the extent that these interrogatories call for an admission the 
same are denied. 
DATED this 3o^ day of Qt^M^ , 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STATE OF UTAH 
^imdAJmmM 
Kenneth L. Alkema 
Director 
Division of Environmental Health 
Utah Department of Health 
288 No. 1460 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
(801) 538-6121 
KENNETH L. ALKEMA 
Director 
Division of Environmental Health 
Utah Department of Health 
288 No. 1460 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
(801) 538-6121 
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MARK S. DAY 
'UMBTRA PrtfJ* 
Bureau of Radiatiori^Control 
Utah Department of Health 
288 No. 1460 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
(801) 538-6734 
FRED NELSON 
s^sfistant Attorney General 
Irice of the Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801) 538-1017 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
V ^ < ^ ^ By__^ ^ 
Den'iSe Chanodill 
S ta te of Utah 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801) 538-1017 
Attorney for Defendants 
_ 1 A -
STATE OF UTAH 
9 * M A N H . B A N G E U T E * O F F I C E O F T H E G O V E R N O R 
GOvtRNO* S A L T L A K E C I T Y 
6 4 1 1 4 
January 19, 1988 
William D. Peterson 
c/o Paul E. Peterson 
2219 Panorama Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dear Mr. Peterson: 
My staff at the Utah Department of Health has been informed of the 
concerns described in your letter of December 29, 1987. The health 
department personnel indicateo to me that they have discussed this problem 
numerous times with you and have exhausted all avenues of remedy as far as 
any State obligation. 
The Department of Health has cooperateo with you by supplying all 
reouested documents for your review. If you would like further information 
from the State's records, we will continue to offer the files for your 
review. Please make an appointment with Mr. Mark S. Day at 538-6734. 
Sincerely, 
Norman H. bahgelter 
Governor 
NHB/MSD/bw 
William D. Peterson 
c/o Paul E. Peterson 
2219 Panorama Way 
Salt Late City, Utah 84117 
December 29, 1987 
Gov. Norman H Bangerter 
State of Utah 
Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lat e City, Utah 
Subject: Vitro Tailing 
Argee Doesn't Pay 
Re-f: Bond No. 944226, Seaboard No. 4035 
Authority No. 752102 
Dear Governor Bangerter: 
I as an Engineer provided the technology -for dumping the RR 
cars at Clive Ut. My company Pemco built and provided the dump 
•facility which enabled the project to be -finishea a year early. 
There was some $200,000 + owing to Pemco -for this wori . Pemco 
has received nothing. I have received nothing. As a result o-f 
not being paid, I have lost all my business assets, 
PEMCO "Froduct Engineering ? Manufacturing Co. waL> 
a twelve year old business, employing up to 65 
employees, doing worl- world wiat, so eci all zing in 
material hanaiing systems, local projects 
including the thirteen mile convenor to Antelooe 
Island, and the Conveyors -for the Cnexron Snale 
research project. 
Since Argee. for you, tool- and used my operating caoital, my-
business has -failed to pro\ice -for me, my v\h-f E , c^c our si 
children; thus, in addition to loosing mv business ($3, "^ 25, 0'JO) , 
I ha\e lost my Wi-fe, Si:; Children, and Home. 
When I worked on the Vitro project, Utah had contracted with 
Argee on the old bond law o-f (Title 14, Chapter 1, Sec. 4, UCfr 
1953, as Amencea). I understand that under the old lew I nc<\e 
rights to reauest and be paid -for my costs o-f doing wor^ -for youi 
benefit, the State o-f Utah. I am hoping that I do have some 
rights and I am thus making a request -for enumeration and am thus 
soliciting -for your help. 
Sincerely yours, 
William D. Peterson, M.S., P.E. 
also. President - Pemco 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312) 
Attorney General 
MELISSA M. HUBBELL (#5090) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
Beneficial Life Tower, 11th Floor 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 533-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. PETERSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THE STATE OF UTAH , MARK S. ] 
DAY, FRED NELSON, KENNETH L. ] 
ALKEMA AND PETER VAN ALSTYNE, ] 
Defendants. ] 
| DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO | PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
) OF INTERROGATORIES 
i Civil No 900900523 
i Judge L. H. Russon 
Defendant, the State of Utah, Department of Corporations, 
Peter Van Alstynef by and through counsel, Assistant Attorney 
General, Melissa M. Hubbell, hereby submits the following Answers 
to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories. 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
1. Defendant objects to the instructions contained in 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories on the grounds and to the 
extent that they request or purport to impose upon the defendants 
1 
^X 
# 
any obligation to respond in a manner or scope beyond the 
requirements set forth in Rules 26-37 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiff's instructions are vague, overbroad, unduly 
burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 
2. Defendant objects to Instruction B to the extent it 
requires disclosure of the home address of employees or former 
employees of the State. 
3. Defendant objects to plaintiff's inflammatory 
introductory statement setting forth purported facts, for the most 
part unrelated to the defendants. The defendant has no information 
or belief as to the truth of the matters asserted and to the extent 
that an admission is requested, the same is denied. This 
introductory language is argumentative, not in accord with 
discovery rules or practice and is an abuse of the discovery 
process. 
4. Defendant objects that plaintiff has failed to 
sequentially number his interrogatories. Where there are 
duplicate-numbered interrogatories, defendants will refer to the 
interrogatory by number as well as the page number where the 
interrogatory appears in plaintiff's document. 
2 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatories Nos. 1-23 pages 3-7 and response thereto; 
These interrogatories are addressed to Defendants Mark S. Day, Fred 
Nelson, and Kenneth L. Alkema and will be answered under separate 
response by them. Peter Van Alstyne has no information or belief 
as to the matters asserted in Interrogatories 1-23 pages 3-8 and to 
the extent that these interrogatories call for an admission, the 
same are denied. 
Interrogatory No. 24: 
Wm Peterson founded Riverside Machine and Fabrication 
(sic) wrote and filed its article of incorporation. Wm Peterson 
was and is its owner. By its board of directors, Riverside Machine 
and Fabrication was merged into Peterson Product Engineering & 
Manufacturing Company. These papers are in file at Utah's Division 
of Corporations. Approval of the corporations filings are display 
(sic) director Peter Van Alstyne's signature. What do the 
defendant's filings show? If there are any differences, what are 
they? 
Answer; 
Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the basis that 
it is vague, overbroad and calls for a legal conclusimi. Without 
waiving said objection, Defendant responds that these documents are 
3 
a matter of public record and available to the Plaintiff. 
Certified copies of these documents are attached. 
Interrogatory No. 25: 
According to John P. Sampson, Robert Mouritsen, and John 
McSweeney, John P. Sampson was this plaintiff's attorney. The 
Board of Directors of Riverside Machine and Fabrications filed 
affidavits declaring conf lictive interest of attorney Sampson where 
he has been representing both sides. Attorney Sampson has never 
resigned from representing Peterson and his company where in the 
court of Judge John Rokich, Peterson has requested that Sampson 
explain his activities and positions and that he resign from his 
representation of Peterson and his company. Sampson has stated 
that he no longer represents Peterson but he has not explained when 
this representation discontinued. In the view of director Peter 
Van Alstyne who has rights to determine for Riverside Machine and 
Fabrication, Wm Peterson who its owner (sic) and his founding board 
of directors, or interfering attorney John P. Sampson and his 
thieving colleagues Robert Mouritsen and John McSweeney? 
Answer: 
The Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the 
grounds that it is not within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not reasonable calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Furthermore, calls for 
4 
speculation on the part of the defendant. In addition
 f the 
question is vague, overbroad and calls for a hypothetical response. 
Interrogatory No. 26; 
By what basis of rules or law is defendant director Peter 
Van Alstyne able to remove lawfully and properly filed documents of 
record which determine ownership and control of the business? 
Answer; 
The Business Corporation Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 
16-10-132 gives Peter Van Alstyne, as director of the Division of 
Corporations, the power and authority reasonably necessary to 
enable him to administer the Business Corporation Act sufficiently 
and to perform the duties therein imposed upon him. 
Interrogatory No. 27; 
By what basis of rules or law is defendant director Peter 
Van Alstyne able to remove the lawfully and properly filed document 
of merger of Peterson's business Riverside Machine and Fabrication? 
Answer; 
See answer to Interrogatory Number 26. 
Interrogatory No. 28; 
Of a business owner, or his conflictive and thieving 
attorney, which, the owner or his counsel, have last rights in 
directing the matters of the owners business? 
5 
Answer: 
Defendant objects to this interrogatory that it is not 
within the scope of discovery, is vague, overbroad, speculative and 
calls for a hypothetical response• Additionally, plaintiff 
requests the defendant to render a legal opinion. 
Interrogatory No. 29: 
In the control of a business, without consent or 
knowledge of the existing board of directors, can outside parties 
elect themselves as the board of directors, make and issue company 
stock to themselves, then record themselves as being the lawful 
board of directors and owners of the business? 
Answer: 
Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the basis that 
it is vague, speculative and calls for a legal conclusion. Without 
waiving said objection defendant states that such action would 
appear to be a violation of statute. 
Interrogatory No. 30: 
Is the policy of defendant director Peter Van Alstyne to 
allow fraudulent thieving business takeovers by the method above 
and by the means the defendant director Peter Van Alstyne has been 
allowing to Mouritsen,, McSweeney, and Sampson? (sic) 
6 
Answer: 
Defendant objects to Interrogatory 30 on the basis of 
Plaintiff's scurrilous and argumentative statements. Defendant 
further objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is 
speculative calls for a hypothetical response, and is vague and 
overbroad. 
Interrogatory No. 31: 
Instead of aiding one side or interfering with the other, 
would it not be better, even more legal, for the defendant's office 
of corporations to not take sides, not change filings, and allow 
conflicting parties to settle their differences in a court of law? 
Answer: 
Defendant objects to this Interrogatory 31 on the grounds 
that the question is speculative, calls for a hypothetical 
response, is not within the scope of the Rules of Discovery and 
furthermore calls for a legal conclusion. 
Interrogatory No. 32: 
In the immediate matter, has not the defendant director 
Van Alstyne taken sides with plaintiff's conflictive attorney 
making defendant additionally liable for plaintiff's losses? 
Defendant's position needs to be declared and justified by its law. 
7 
Answer: 
Defendant objects to the assertion in Plaintiff's 
interrogatory that the State has taken sides in any conflict 
between Plaintiff and his attorney. Defendant further objects on 
the basis that this questions is vague, speculative and calls for 
a legal conclusion^. 
Interrogatory No. 33; 
Copies of plaintiff's filings bearing the approving 
signature of their filings are included. Defendant Van Alstyne's 
position needs to be declared and justified by its law as to 
plaintiff's rights and the current status of his filings. 
Answer: 
Interrogatory 33 does not appear to be a question. 
Defendant objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is 
not within the scope of discovery under Rule 26 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence and calls for a legal conclusion. 
DATED this \Q day of August, 1990. 
Attorney General ~ ^  Respectfully submitted, 
R. .Fau/T^an Dam
 y , ( M A ! // / STATE QF, U; 
Melissa M. Hubbell Peter Van Alstyne 
Assistant Attorney General Director 
Attorney for Defendant Division of Corporations 
Peter Van Alstyne 
